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ABSTRACT
For all purposes and intents, being able to infer the topology of a network is crucial to both
operators and adversaries alike. Traceroute is a common active probing technique but it
may be subverted by deceptive responses. We identify possible inconsistencies in tracer-
oute deception systems, and endeavor to find potential deception in the historic IPv4 Routed
/24 Topology Dataset from the Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA). Our re-
sults show three major patterns in 2013 and 2014 that exhibited instances of inconsistencies
matching the techniques in our methodology. In addition to analyzing the historic dataset,
we evaluate three cases of traceroute manipulation in the wild. These case studies in-
clude The Pirate Bay (TPB) server supposedly residing in North Korea, the Star Wars- and
Christmas Carol-themed gags involving customized Domain Name System (DNS) names,
and the experimental DeTracer at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). In the TPB case,
we discovered extensive and long-running deception in the /24 subnet. We find intriguing
patterns in the gag traceroutes and fake topologies from the DeTracer for which we may use
to improve our filtering process. In all, the findings will aid future operations in verifying
inferred network topologies from traceroutes.
v
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Active network probing is a means of discovering a target network’s configuration and
topology. Many networks and organizations block outside probing for privacy or com-
petitive reasons. This thesis considers an alternate defensive strategy: topology deception.
Specifically, we seek to discover properties of deceptive topology countermeasures that hint
at their existence, and exploit those properties to discover the prevalence of such systems
across the Internet.
According to the definition used in the ATIS Telecom Glossary [1], the network topology
is the “specific physical, i.e., real, or logical, i.e., virtual, arrangement of the elements of a
network.” We consider the elements in the target network like computers, routers, servers,
and switches. For instance, a typical active network topology probing operation will enable
the creation of a human-readable visual network map.
1.1 Network Topology Probing
Reconnaissance of an adversary’s operating areas is a key initial element when defining a
concept of operations for future cyber missions. Likewise, in a world interconnected by
high-speed networks and shared transmission hubs, intelligence gained from an organiza-
tion’s network topology could allow malicious actors to prioritize their mission objectives
and identify especially weak or critical points in the network.
Knowledge of the network topology has benefits to internal and external users of the net-
work. The network administrators might be interested in identifying the traffic bottlenecks
and perform rerouting to ease congestion. In like manner, content providers desire optimal
delivery of paid content and will seek to find alternative paths to their customers. Adver-
saries could discover network elements of high utilization to be possible single points of
failure and carry out denial-of-service attacks. They may consider injecting a network tap
into those elements to become potential traffic eavesdropping points. They may also com-
promise a border machine and use it as a pivot point to attack other machines on the same
1
network, in an effort to bypass firewall restrictions on external connections.
A common active probing technique is to perform a traceroute to a target network destina-
tion in order to determine the forward path (sequence of router interfaces from the source
to the destination).
1.2 Probing Countermeasures
A defender can elect to either deny active probing with network filters such as firewalls, or
deceive incoming probes with falsified data so as to present a fictitious network. With fire-
walls, the defender is able to filter incoming probes but some diagnostics capabilities will
be lost in the event of network outages. A balance between isolation and troubleshooting
capability has to be found for such configurations. On the other hand, data representing
a false network topology could be presented to the probes by simulation or using actual
decoy hardware.
An alternative decoy technology available is the honeypot. Honeypots and honeynets are
canonical examples of decoys that are frequently used for deception and intelligence gath-
ering. Spitzner [2] states that a honeypot is a “security resource whose value lies in being
probed, attacked or compromised.” A honeynet consists of two or more honeypots in the
same network. A honeypot appears to be a legitimate part of the network and lures would-
be attackers to compromise it. It is a continuously monitored, isolated system made up of
physical or virtual components. In our case, honeypots may be used for deceiving probes
and alerting the defender if necessary.
A documented case of employing decoy hardware was the “Star Wars Traceroute” ad-
vertised on the Internet by Werber in 2013 [3]. He deployed two Cisco 1841 Integrated
Services Routers with Virtual Routing and Forwarding (VRF) [4] and allowed traceroute
traffic to be redirected into the two-router chain, generating a custom themed message when
the IP addresses were resolved.
In the case of traceroute probing, the defender may manipulate the return traffic with de-
ception outcomes such as hiding legitimate nodes, seeding virtual nodes, and masquerading
as other nodes. Critical servers and routers are common examples of legitimate nodes that
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benefit from obscurity. Virtual nodes could be injected to portray the existence of a smaller
internal network and bait possible attackers into investing time and effort to probe them.
This enables redirection of an adversary’s focus as well as enabling monitoring on those
nodes. As the virtual nodes are dedicated decoys, any detected activity is less likely to be
considered benign and may be investigated promptly. Nodes masquerading as legitimate
nodes may cause confusion if they appear to be connected when no such direct link exists
in the real world. An example of such a pretense could be showing adjacent routers being
located in countries that do not have direct land or sea communication links to each other.
1.3 Imperfection in Deception
As with all implementations of deception systems, there is a possibility of misconfiguration
or flaws, either accidental or deliberate. The implementing party may not have considered
all cases and has omitted certain modifications, which leave clues due to an incomplete
fabrication. In another case, the deception system may only be designed to counter probes
using a specific protocol. An adversary opting to perform active probing using several pro-
tocols may observe inconsistencies and become suspicious. In addition to inconsistencies
arising from incomplete implementations, sections of the presented deception may not be
feasible. Some of the reasons include latency mismatches in deception-supplied and direct
packets, impossible physical connections according to the return probes, as well as prior
known ground truth.
Aside from imperfections in network topology deception, there may be discrepancies in
other deception systems that adversaries may take advantage of to establish authenticity
of the presented output. An example is the capitalization of the fact that tarpits such as
LaBrea [5] do not return Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) options in its responses,
and this revelation can then be used to suggest the existence of a tarpit [6].
Not all network topology deception is designed with the goal to improve network security.
There are elaborate gags that control a series of specially crafted, themed Domain Name
System (DNS) names such that the eventual output of regular traceroutes tells a story. An
example of a such a gag was a reddit post that encouraged users to traceroute to a specific
website [7]. The traceroute responses returned Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that, when
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resolved, were in the form of a Christmas carol.
1.4 Countermeasure Detection
It has been reported that The Pirate Bay, a popular torrent website, performed topology de-
ception by replying to traceroutes with extraneous and false data in 2013 [8]. A blogger by
the name of Will [9], wrote that by performing traceroutes of the IP addresses present in his
original traceroute response of the website, he discovered the path taken was significantly
different. Specifically, he mentioned the Autonomous System (AS) numbers resolved from
the IP addresses did not actually link up with each other and this implied that a portion of
the reported route was fake. The inconsistency was discovered as a result of deeper probing
and elimination of false leads. While this is a known isolated example, this thesis seeks to
cast a wide net and generally discover the extent of topology deception present on the wider
Internet.
This thesis relies on data that is publicly available to researchers from the Center for Ap-
plied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA). The data are examined for inconsistencies in return-
ing traceroute probes from a target network that may reveal the presence of deception. The
scope is limited to past and present traceroute data collected from vantage points across
the globe. The prevalence of traceroute deception on the broader Internet is a subsidiary
research question.
1.5 Thesis Structure
• Chapter 1 introduces the reader to network topology probing and deceptive counter-
measures, and highlights the factors that diminish the quality of deception, leading
to the development of specific detection methods.
• Chapter 2 explains concepts related to traceroutes and network topology deception.
• Chapter 3 discusses the methodology for filtering the CAIDA datasets and the tech-
niques used for revealing traceroute deception. It also presents case studies of real-
world scenarios of possible deception.
• Chapter 4 reports our findings based on the filtered CAIDA datasets. We also analyze
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data on some real-world examples that exhibit interesting network topologies.
• Chapter 5 presents our conclusions as well as future work.
5
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CHAPTER 2:
Background and Review of Literature
This chapter introduces the concepts, data sources, and tools used for network topology
probing. The deception inconsistencies are explored in greater depth, followed by a review
of prior literature on topology deception.
2.1 Traceroute Concepts
The concept of traceroute is to provide insight into the forwarding of IP packets to their
destinations. While traceroute [10] is both the name of a utility present in most operat-
ing systems as well as a term for the said utility’s output, it is now generally considered
a technique. Traceroutes are often employed as a diagnostic tool to investigate and trou-
bleshoot network issues. A typical traceroute implementation uses User Datagram Pro-
tocol (UDP), Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), or Internet Control Message Proto-
col (ICMP). Different operating system families tend to use different protocols in their
traceroute implementations. For instance, the Microsoft Windows tool “tracert” adopts the
use of ICMP [11], while “traceroute” in Linux systems [10] uses UDP as its default pro-
tocol. The traceroute technique is heavily reliant on the interpretation of replies from the
routers along the path to destination host. As these replies lack any form of authentication
and non-repudiation features, they are susceptible to data manipulation for the purposes
of masking the network topology, impersonating other hosts, and/or the host operator’s
preference.
Under IPv4, a traceroute sends a series of probes with incrementing Time-to-Live (TTL)
values to a destination. Each router along the forward path decrements the probe packet’s
TTL value, and if the TTL value is zero, discards the packet and replies to the prober
with an ICMP error datagram. As routers provide interfaces for two or more networks to
connect to each other, there must be a selection process that decides which interface address
to use as the source of the ICMP datagram. Traceroute only reveals the router interfaces
receiving and responding to the forwarded probe. Links in between the original prober and
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its final destination are commonly known as “hops.” The two ICMP message types seen in
the responses must be either Time Exceeded or Destination Unreachable. By default, the
prober expects a Time Exceeded message for each hop, except the destination for which
it expects a Port Unreachable sub-type of the Destination Unreachable type. The Time
Exceeded message includes the first 64-bits [12] of the original datagram’s data, allowing
the traceroute to compare source addresses and map ICMP responses to the corresponding
hops. It has to be noted that this method is causing only the nodes along the path from
the original prober to its final destination to report, and does not infer that the return path
is always the same. The interpretation of these responses allows the sender to infer the
resultant network topology and the per-hop RTT latencies as shown in Figure 2.1 and Figure
2.2.
Tracing route from 1.2.3.4 to 5.6.7.8:
Router A [1.2.3.1] 100ms 90ms 100ms
Router B [2.3.4.99] 120ms 120ms 130ms
Router C [3.4.5.99] 150ms 135ms 160ms
Destination [4.5.6.7] 200ms 230ms 220ms
Figure 2.1: An example of traceroute output.
A typical traceroute usually sends three probes in succession for each TTL value. In the ex-
ample result shown in Figure 2.1, the first column reports each of the discovered node with
its corresponding interface’s IP address. The round-trip time taken for each of the probes is
shown in the last three columns. By default, groups of three probes are sent to compensate
for random packet loss and network jitter. The shortest time of the returning probes in the
group will be recorded. Figure 2.2 shows an inferred network topology diagram obtained
from the results as shown in Figure 2.1. The first group of probes with a TTL of one arriv-
ing at Router A will invoke a response through the 1.2.3.1 interface back to the source. The
next series of probes of TTL value two will pass Router A and invoke a return response
via Router B’s 2.3.4.99 interface as the probe TTLs become zero. Subsequently, the third
group of probes will trigger a similar effect at Router C. Finally, the probes arriving at the
destination 4.5.6.7 will return an ICMP Destination/Port Unreachable message.
8
.
Figure 2.2: Inferred network topology from traceroute.
2.2 Paris Traceroute
Augustin et al. [13] has shown that traceroute does not guarantee precise mapping of a
network due to the presence of load balancing routers. Routers along the forward path may
reside in different networks and have varying data-spreading policies. Their respective
network administrators may employ load balancing to redirect data packets to alternative
routers based on the current network utilization. The outcome is the existence of alternative
routes to the desired destination over the course of the traceroute operation.
There are three main policy categories of load balancing: per-flow, per-packet, and per-
destination. The Request for Comments (RFC) 3917 [14] states that “a flow is defined as a
set of IP packets passing an observation point in the network during a certain time interval.”
Per-flow load balancing looks at the packet header information of each packet, assigns the
packet to a flow, and ensures that the router does not disrupt packets belonging to the
same flow during the routing process. From the surface, default traceroute probes from the
same source are very likely to end up in the same flow for that hop. Unfortunately, the
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variance in each consecutive distinct probe, for example, varying Destination Port fields,
can cause the flow identifier to change. In comparison, per-packet load balancing forwards
packets in a round-robin fashion, based on the current network utilization, and increases
the likelihood of successive probes being forwarded to different next hop routers. This
generates conflicting replies during the affected hops, which leads to multiple branches in
the resultant route. Per-destination load balancing is similar to per-flow since it enforces
redirection based on the destination IP address. The impact of these load balancing policies
is that anomalies such as loops, cycles, diamonds, missing nodes and links, and false links
will introduce errors in the topology mapping process.
Augustin et al. also introduces Paris Traceroute, which aims to provide a more accurate
picture of actual packet flows. It manipulates the probe packet header fields in order for
load balancing routers to maintain a constant flow identifier for its probes, and yet be able
to match reply packets to their corresponding probe packets. This thesis utilizes results
from the Paris Traceroute to determine whether inconsistencies found contribute to actual
deception.
2.3 Autonomous Systems
The definition of an AS is “a connected group of one or more IP prefixes run by one or
more network operators which has a single and clearly defined routing policy” [15]. These
network operators are commonly Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or significantly sized
organizations like the Department of Defense (DOD), operating separate connections to
various networks. Each AS is to be assigned a globally unique Autonomous System Num-
ber (ASN) as an identifier and also used in the exchange of exterior routing information
between adjacent ASs [15].
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is an inter-AS protocol used to exchange network reach-
ability information between different ASs [16]. A BGP speaking system uses TCP and
maintains a table of AS paths for the forward of packets belonging to specific subnets.
These AS paths will reveal information about the route in which traceroute responses tra-
verse through. Thus, the physical path may then be analyzed for connections between ASs
of non-bordering countries.
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2.4 CAIDA Ark and Scamper
CAIDA [17] is “a collaborative undertaking among organizations in the commercial, gov-
ernment, and research sectors aimed at promoting greater cooperation in the engineering
and maintenance of a robust, scalable global Internet infrastructure.” CAIDA is also an op-
erator of a globally distributed measurement platform named Archipelago (Ark), with the
primary goals of cutting down on effort required for complex large-scale measurements,
and promoting community-oriented measurement infrastructure with collaborators being
able to run their own vetted measurement tasks [18].
CAIDA hosts measurement datasets collected from 1998 onwards such as the Internet Pro-
tocol version 4 (IPv4) Routed /24 Topology Dataset [19]. This dataset consists of scamper
warts [20] files categorized according to the probing host and day, which contain traceroute
data across all /24 prefixes in the routed IPv4 address space. Luckie [21] designed Scam-
per to be a scalable and extensible packet-prober for active measurement of the Internet. It
includes an implementation of Paris Traceroute for analyzing network topology and per-
formance. The parallel probing nature of Scamper is a good fit for the collection of active
measurement data on Ark. Hence, this thesis entails working with the IPv4 Routed /24
Topology Dataset, augmented with IPv4 Routed /24 DNS Names Dataset [22] and the Uni-
versity of Oregon Route Views Archive Project [23] to allow IP address to AS matchups.
Warts [20] is the native binary output file format of Scamper. It is extensible and able
to record considerable detail as well as meta data on each measurement. Scamper also
supports output to ASCII text.
The IPv4 dataset was generated in a methodological way as documented [19] in its dis-
tribution page. The probing work consisted of continuously sending out scamper probes
performing traceroute to all routed /24 networks in the IPv4 address space. The load was
divided among three teams of approximately 17—18 Ark monitors in different geograph-
ical regions. A destination address would be picked at random from each routed IPv4 /24
prefix on the Internet. Another constraint was the /24 prefix that the address belonged to
had to be unique across all monitors within a probing cycle of around 48 hours. Each




Successful traceroute responses confer the ability to know more about the physical forward
path taken by the probes. Geolocation may be performed on IP addresses through database
lookups, measuring delays from multiple vantage points, and obtaining clues from DNS
Pointer Records (PTRs) [24]. A whois of the IP address queries Regional Internet Reg-
istriess (RIRs) will reveal information on the ISP and ASN [25]. As ISPs and ASNs are
bound to specific countries, they at least provide a coarse-grained picture of the traversed
route. Likewise, the DNS PTR may offer hints on the country origin based on the host-
name, if available. The use of delay-based measurements takes advantage of the differences
in Round Trip Times (RTT) between geographically distributed vantage points and chosen
landmarks. This concept is beneficial to unmasking deception and is explored further in
Chapter 3.
The time delay between sending an outgoing probe and receiving its corresponding re-
sponse on the prober’s machine is known as the RTT. It also reveals information on the
distance traveled by the probe. The sources of RTT include i) propagation delay, ii) trans-
mission delay, iii) processing and iv) queueing. Propagation delay is the time taken for
a bit to transit between two routers, while transmission delay is the delay resulting from
pushing a packet onto the transmission medium. In most cases, the propagation delay is
dynamic from varying route and traffic conditions, and dominates the fixed transmission
delay, which is dependent on the medium used such as copper and fiber cables, or wire-
less links. The processing delay comes from time spent by routers performing parsing and
processing on the packet headers. Lastly, the queuing delay is dependent on time spent
waiting in the buffer of both the sender and receiver devices. It must be noted the delay-
based geolocation is relatively inaccurate due to the above sources of delay, as well as
routing strategies causing inefficient routes such as circuits and loops. Given that the RTT
is calculated on the prober’s machine, the country of destination is known, and coupled
with signal propagation at the speed of light, the minimum delay possible will be the time
taken for light to make a round trip.
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2.6 Deception in Computer Security
Computer security encompasses a wide range of security topics centered around data,
computers, and computer networks. From the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) definition, computer security comprises of “measures and controls that
ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information system assets including
hardware, software, firmware, and information being processed, stored, and communi-
cated” [26]. Computer Network Defense (CND) is a term categorizing defensive actions
selected against unauthorized activity within computer networks [26]. Yuill states that a
deception operation is a planned set of actions taken to mislead hackers and thereby cause
them to either embark on or avoid specific actions that aid CND [27]. As an illustration, an
offensive mission may apply deception within an adversary’s domain or deploy deceptive
defensive countermeasures on home ground.
Deception systems could be improved by understanding the nature of deceit and how it
works in general. Almeshekah et al. elucidated a model for planning and integrating decep-
tion in security defenses effectively [28]. They covered a taxonomy of deceitful techniques
revolving around the concepts of hiding reality and simulating substitutes. The act of hid-
ing included masking the existence of valued parts, repackaging as a camouflage method,
and dazzling as an approach to causing confusion among similar objects. The second con-
cept targeted methods to mimic or imitate, inventing non-existent components, and provide
decoys to divert attention. They also outlined the need for understanding and exploiting
potential adversaries’ biases. The success of a defensive deception system depended on
sustainable and plausible alternative perceptions.
Denning described the differences between active and passive cyber defenses using an ac-
tive and passive air defense analogy [29]. Active defenses include Intrusion Prevention
System (IPS), firewalls, honeypots, access controls, among others. The rationale for hon-
eypots and the like is the diversion of attackers’ attention to isolated systems where their
behavior can be monitored. The result is similar to the act of deflecting approaching mis-
siles and rockets. In contrast, passive cyber defense considers cryptography, monitoring,
vulnerability assessment, cybersecurity education, and so forth as examples that empha-
sizes on making systems tougher to be attacked. In this thesis, we focus on the defensive
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aspect of deception operations carried out by adversaries in their networks.
Heckman et al. summarized some of the possible resources supporting a cyber deception
operation and includes honeypots, “fake honeypots,” “fake fake honeypots,” honeynets,
honeyclients, honeytokens, and tarpits [30]. They highlighted an interesting use of decep-
tion where the defenders in a cyber-wargame experiment activated a CND tool to selec-
tively redirect adversaries to a fake system that dynamically rewrote content from the real
system. A shortcoming of the tool was that the adversaries gained access to both fake and
real systems and could subsequently recognize some telltale signs of deception.
2.7 Topology Deception
Traceroute is the de facto probing technique and tool for topology mapping [31]. Tracer-
oute deception is an example of internal defense described in [29] since the deception is
done in the defender’s network instead of the attacker’s. For traceroute probes originating
from a local network where latencies are typically low, the essential concern is to detect
and craft responses to all types of probes whose source IP addresses indicate their origin
from a network controlled by the defenders. Incoming probes from the wider Internet usu-
ally have to transit through various ASs and possibly crossing over into other geographical
regions. Organizations deploying deception have to examine these additional aspects when
designing their deception systems. They might also consider between two forms of tracer-
oute deception, mainly inventing replies with spoofed IP addresses or manipulating replies
based on the real physical topology. The first option offers the best flexibility at the cost of
greater computing resources. The second option allows the network load to be balanced but
constraints the deceptive topology due to the dependence on the physical network layout.
Prior work in this field [32] [33] detailed methodologies for manipulating the perception
generated from an adversary’s analysis of the traceroute probe responses. The implemen-
tation required modification of the router kernel in order to deliver custom fake responses
to traceroute probes.
Trassare et al. [34] introduced a methodology for deceiving incoming traceroute probes
and providing a configurable illusion of a network topology to the prober. Their effort
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concentrated on adversarial active probing, of which traceroute is the tool of choice.
Trassare et al. focus on benefits to the military counter-intelligence by providing both ran-
dom and intelligent masking methods. The random method is akin to military radar jam-
mers in an electronic warfare (EW) suite emitting false radio frequency (RF) signatures,
and generates responses to traceroute probes with pseudorandom source addresses based
on a random number generator. Although such deception may be unraveled by more so-
phisticated adversaries, the primary purpose is to add frustration and delay to the topology
mapping process. The intelligent method is more elaborate and aims to turn the existing
genuine topology into a deceptive version that shields critical infrastructure nodes of high
value.
The implementation was performed by developing a Linux kernel module for a virtual
Cisco 3725 router as a proof of concept. The experiment setup involved using the Graphical
Network Simulator (GNS3) due to the ease of virtualization of hardware and software
components. The custom kernel is an illustration of a deception system simulating false
responses. Simulation helps to replace hardware decoys by taking on their specialized
roles with respect to traceroute responses.
In order to unmask such deception, the prober has to adopt a multipronged approach of dis-
covering inconsistencies in the deception by means of further probing with varied methods.
West built on on Trassare’s work on detecting traceroute probes and developed a tool called
DeTracer to present a fake network topology to incoming IPv4 probes [33]. The tool was
able to portray the alternative routes for IP addresses of a given source-destination pair.
It covered the usage of UDP, TCP, ICMP, paris-traceroute, scamper, and nmap traceroute
probes and successfully responded with a deceptive route.
The initial experiment was carried on using virtual machines playing the role of a prober,
DeTracer, and web server. Although there were some inconsistencies with the unrealistic
probe RTTs, they disappeared when individual physical machines were deployed instead.
In addition to the localized laboratory experiment, West deployed DeTracer on a single IP
address on the public Internet. Global probers such as Ark would then be able to probe and
obtain a fake traceroute result. The DeTracer demonstrated the traceroute replies containing
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made-up hops with IP addresses with realistic RTTs. It also replicated a portion of the fake
path presented in the Pirate Bay case in Chapter 3.
2.8 Topology Deception Inconsistencies
This thesis assumes active deception is being implemented on some of the destination hosts,
with the goal of intentionally deceiving incoming probes and portraying a divergent net-
work topology. As such, the goal is to methodologically distinguish between honest and
deceptive hosts. This fabricated topology may hide critical servers or show a honeypot
disguised as a series of routers. We consider unusual but legitimate traceroutes that exhibit
characteristics of an elaborate gag to be of interest. A known instance is the Christmas carol
traceroute made viral in a reddit post [7]. It is possible that deception systems in the wild
are not always perfect. Hence, an imperfect active deception system will exhibit incon-
sistencies and anomalies, which may indicate the use of deception in the return traceroute
data. These imperfections would be most suitable for exploitation.
There is a particular field of note in every IPv4 packet called the IPv4 Identification (IPID)
field. Its original intention was to provide a mechanism to distinguish fragments of one
packet from another by having unique identifiers within the same source-destination pair
and protocol [35]. Bellovin noted that consecutive packets originating from the same host
would also contain IPID values of a sequential nature [36]. In theory, if a single host were
to reply to traceroute probes on behalf of other hosts, the resultant replies would contain
consecutive IPID values as well. More information on this field and its use as a possible




Our methodology is to obtain and analyze the CAIDA routed topology dataset by building
a software parser that accepts scamper warts files and filters the set of traceroutes according
to a set of predefined criteria. We use CAIDA traceroute data for 2013 and 2014, together
with their corresponding DNS names from the CAIDA site and external AS datasets from
the Route Views Project, as detailed in Section 3.2.5. The approach is to comb through
entries in the 2013 dataset to identify traceroutes with certain interesting characteristics,
filter and perform additional analysis on them, and compare the findings for equivalent
entries in the 2014 dataset.
In addition, we utilize instances of known ground truth such as The Pirate Bay case and
the Christmas carol themed traceroute mentioned briefly in Chapter 2 and reported on the
Internet in recent years as case studies for classification and verification. Some of these
instances of known ground truth are no longer operational, hence we must rely on analyzing
historic traceroutes. In contrast, other examples of known topology deception were running
at the time of this thesis work, hence we are able to perform additional probing and analysis.
The inconsistencies found are compared against the actual deception strategy.
3.1 Types of Deception Inconsistencies
There are several possible discernible differences that may contribute to the unmasking of a
deception system, but vary in their effectiveness. Certain differences are not definitive—an
example of which will be timing delays that have many non-deceptive causes including
load balancing and queues. In some cases, comparative results from multiple sources are
stronger indicators, while others require a combination of results across multiple hops to
be indicative. This section discusses the major types of deception inconsistencies that may
be used as our filtering criteria. The following list is not exhaustive and acts as potential
indicators of an anomaly, which may suggest either intentional or benign manipulation of
the interred topology from traceroutes. It also serves as a starting point for our investigation
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into possible deception.
3.1.1 Packet Delay Correlation
Any deceit aiming to confuse the prober will have to respond with appropriate delays ac-
cording to the adversary’s deception strategy. The RTT, as explained in Section 2.5, is a
loose metric for measuring delays. It provides only a lower bound on the feasible distance.
The minimum delay also means that the deceiver will not be able to spoof responses shorter
than what is possible from its physical geographical position. While the adversary could
add delay via artificial means, to enforce the perception that the target is further away, it is
not possible to decrease the delay significantly without a change of location.
Each traceroute hop can be checked for infeasible latencies based on their geolocated IP
addresses and the prober’s known location. For example, if the hop destination is known
to be in a region 5,000 miles (8046.72km) from the prober, it will be suspicious to obtain
a RTT of 40ms as it is physically unrealistic due to signal processing, delays from routers
and switches, and so forth. Considering only propagation delay in a route composed of
optic fiber, the observed delay of 40ms will mean a minimum distance of around 5,000
miles between the sender and receiver, as light in a vacuum travels at a reduced speed of
approximately 66% [37] of the original speed of light. The lack of realism stems from
the fact that the cumulative result from other types of delays (e.g, processing delays from
routers along the way, etc.) will mean that the overall RTT will exceed the theoretical
minimum.
We may also subject the target to additional TCP probing by sending a TCP SYN packet
and observe the delay in its reply from the target. Under normal circumstances, the target
replies with a TCP SYN/ACK packet, and the delay is recorded. If the target is running
a deception operation for traceroutes, it is possible that the system may fail to manipulate
the delay for ordinary TCP packets. For example, a traceroute may report a destination
RTT of 600ms, while measurement of RTTs of the first two phases of the TCP three-way
handshake yielded a consistent 100ms period. This could be due to injected latencies in the
traceroute data. This technique can only be used against a live or operational host, unless
such probing has been performed and recorded previously during the original traceroute.
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3.1.2 Perceived Geographical Discrepancies
Resolved IP addresses using DNS, whois, or other IP geolocation techniques provide clues
to the country in which the device is situated. If the countries identified in all hops are
not adjacent and do not have an undersea link connecting them directly, this clue raises a
possibility of a fake hop inserted into the traceroute response.
One instance of such a case is a traceroute report showing a hop from the continental
United States to North Korea. News reports indicated that the entire North Korea’s Internet
traffic flowed through China Unicom routers, hence a direct link to the United States is
not possible [38]. Another example could be when a traceroute report shows hops from
continental United States to multiple countries in the Middle East and back to the United
States in a successive manner. A packet is unlikely to traverse such a route unless it is on
a deliberate circuit. A deliberate circuit may be a case of intentional manipulation or just
plain misconfiguration.
3.1.3 Inconsistent Hop Limit Values
Each IPv4 packet contains a TTL or hop limit field, which acts a mechanism to control the
lifetime of the packet as it traverses through the networks. In traceroutes, the TTL value
is decremented by one for every hop the packet traverses. Hops are simply nodes, or more
specifically in this case, routers in which the packet traverses en route to its destination, as
discussed in Section 2.1. According to RFC 792 [12], the resultant ICMP Time Exceeded
message sent has to include the first eight bytes of the original datagram’s data. Therefore,
responses from each router along the forward path should contain the original datagram’s
incrementing TTL values. This allows the prober to map ICMP responses to the packets
it sent. The TTL value in the matched packet originally sent by the sender is the probe
TTL. The quoted TTL is the based on the TTL value in the actual datagram received by
the responding machine. Duplicate or inconsistent TTL values may indicate anomalies.
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3.1.4 Continuous Consecutive IP Identification Values
As most operating systems implement an incrementing IPID for every packet they send out,
as discussed in Section 2.8, and relying on the fact that it is unlikely for two hosts to have
synchronized IPID velocities, it is unlikely that a list of resultant IPIDs from a traceroute
will have sequential and monotonic IPID values. Subsequently, if there are consecutive
IPIDs from two successive hops, it is potentially an anomaly and may indicate deception.
3.1.5 Autonomous System Link Discrepancies
An inconsistency in AS links is similar to the above-mentioned perceived geographical
location discrepancy. Suppose two AS are known not to have a direct connection to each
other and a traceroute indicates otherwise, this could be indicative of an anomaly. As AS
links change from time to time, it is imperative that the date of BGP table data used to
determine the AS links be as close to the traceroutes as possible.
3.1.6 Multiple Probe Types
An incomplete deception system may generate false traceroute returns for one type of probe
and neglect another. Different types of probes were discussed in Section 2.1. Different
responses from different probe type may indicate the presence of such deception. For
instance, a deception system built specifically for deceiving UDP and ICMP traceroutes
might have left out an equivalent implementation to respond to TCP probes. The prober
can send multiple traceroutes based on UDP, TCP, and ICMP in an attempt to identify
inconsistencies in RTT, TTL, IPID, and location, etc.
3.1.7 Multiple Ingress Points
Trassare noted that the deceptive topology presented to incoming probes should be consis-
tent across all ingress points [32]. This is to say that traceroutes performed from multiple
vantage points should infer network topologies that are not too divergent from one another.
Therefore, the deception may fail if the prober discovered a significantly different topol-
20
ogy when probing from another vantage point or had access to an internal machine that
bypasses the deception mechanism completely.
3.1.8 Common Subnet Hops
The detection of multiple hops within the same subnet in a traceroute may indicate traversal
through an AS or single organization network. As with the case with multiple ingress
points, an incomplete or misconfigured deception topology may present cycles or loops in
the traceroute traffic. For instance, if the traceroute shows a path taken through a subnet A,
followed by an exit to some faraway location and then a return to subnet A, the ensuring
loop may raise questions on the forwarding strategy.
3.2 Filtering the IPv4 Routed /24 Topology Dataset
The downloaded dataset [19] from CAIDA was cataloged according to team, year, cycle,
and, finally, host monitor. Each team-year-cycle-host item is a compressed collection of
traceroutes in Scamper’s warts native binary format. On average, each warts file in 2013
contained 66,000 traceroutes. The 2013 data consists of 37,106 warts files grouped into
208 cycle folders. The cycle folders are a form of classification for IP addresses probed
in a standard probing cycle of around 48 hours. Each cycle contains the individual output
from around 17—18 geographically distributed unique monitors for each team, which are
machines doing the actual probing work. The total disk space used for the 2013 /24 Topol-
ogy Dataset was about 850 gigabytes. The 2014 dataset was slightly larger at about 900
gigabytes. Our main focus was on the 2013 dataset, with the 2014 dataset as a reference
comparison. A leading motivation for this selective focus is the Pirate Bay case.
To scope the thesis, we elected to perform a limited set of filters as described in the subse-
quent subsections to sieve out interesting traces for more detailed examination. The con-
secutive IPIDs and duplicate TTLs filters were chosen due to their ease of implementation.
The workflow is as follows:
1. Filter the 2013 dataset by consecutive IPIDs and duplicate TTLs.
2. Build a sorted summary of results.
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3. Identify potential traceroutes for further analysis.
4. Filter selected traceroutes for faster DNS and AS matching.
5. Perform DNS and AS matching for each hop in the selected traceroutes.
6. Extract traceroutes in the 2014 dataset with the same destination as those previously
identified in the 2013 dataset.
7. Perform DNS and AS matching on the extracted 2014 list.
3.2.1 Consecutive IPIDs
We scanned each warts file in 2013 for records that exhibit characteristics of continuous
consecutive IPIDs. This filter algorithm parses the traceroute result and records the follow-
ing information:
• LCONSEC. This is the largest number of hops containing a continuous consecutive
IPIDs chain with the constraint that the detected chain must be at the end of the 
traceroute. As we are parsing historical data, the end of the traceroute will be based 
on the data that is available to us in the dataset. It may not be the actual destination 
due to the occurrence of non-responsive nodes. A chain can be understood as a series 
of hops in consecutive order. This constraint is based on the speculation that some 
deception systems spoof all the responses from a single network interface after a 
certain hop. An example can be seen in Table 3.1.
• LDCONSEC. This is similar to the above LCONSEC statistic, but it takes distinct
IP addresses into consideration. Distinct addresses allow us to differentiate between 
seemingly erroneous chains of identical addresses and typical unique chains. An 
example can be seen in Table 3.2.
• ACONSEC. This is the largest number of hops containing a continuous consecutive
IPIDs chain within the traceroute. It acts as a rough metric and does not cater for 
distinct addresses. It is also a looser form of the LCONSEC case in that chains do not 
have to terminate at the end of the traceroute. Table 3.3 demonstrates an instance of 
ACONSEC.
• ADCONSEC. This item is the fine-grained version of the above ACONSEC statis-





























Table 3.2: Example of LDCONSEC chain with 3 continuous consecutive IPID hops and distinct
IP addresses ending at the last hop.
As traceroute results are not always perfect and contain missing responses, our parser will
ignore the non-responsive hops, and continue to determine any consecutive IPID chains
without them. The advantage of this implementation is that we can quickly identify con-
secutive chains. The downsides are that long chains may be broken into smaller chains, and
very short chains of three hops may never be discovered. We leave the work of identifying




























Table 3.4: Example of ADCONSEC chain with 3 continuous consecutive IPID hops with distinct
IP addresses without location constraints.
3.2.2 Continuous Duplicate TTLs
We included a check for continuous duplicate TTL values and recorded the highest num-
ber of continuous duplicate TTL values for each traceroute. This check is to be performed
together with the above consecutive IPID filtering such that the filtered results will either
contain consecutive IPIDs and/or duplicate TTLs. We speculate that a high continuous du-
plicate TTL count may be a result of an incomplete deception system where the responding
machine fakes new hops with IP address as the only variable component.
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3.2.3 Filter Summaries
The next step after compiling the filtered traceroutes was to build a summary of the re-
sults for each year. The summary contains the various consecutive IPID and duplicate TTL
statistics, as a function of the length of the chain. This summary allows us to quickly
identify the number of traceroutes containing anomalous chains of different lengths. Be-
cause the number of anomalous chains decreases exponentially in their length, we obtain a
manageable number of candidate traceroutes for more detailed examination.
3.2.4 Inconsistency Identification
Based on the filter summary, we identify a threshold point as our starting point of investiga-
tion. For instance, the traceroutes that fall within the top 10 highest number of consecutive
IPIDs and duplicate TTLs may be considered as candidates for a second round of filtering.
After that, we proceed with the DNS and AS matching process for a better picture of the
perceived geographical locations of the IP addresses in each hop of the traceroutes.
3.2.5 DNS and AS Matching
The IPv4 Routed /24 DNS Names Dataset [22] had a different structure from the earlier
topology dataset in that the data was grouped into year, month, and day. The DNS lookups
were performed typically in a short time after each traceroute for better matching purposes.
Each year-month-day item is a compressed collection of IP addresses and DNS names in
plain text. In total, there were 805,523,249 IP-DNS entries in 2013. The 2013 dataset
consumed about 48 gigabytes of disk space. The 2014 dataset had 874,568,595 entries and
took up about 50 gigabytes of disk space.
We used the dataset from the University of Oregon Route Views Archive Project [23] to
obtain the AS information. While the IPv4 Routed /24 AS Links Dataset [39] existed, it did
not have direct IP address to AS mappings that we could use. The Route Views dataset was
grouped by year-month directories and contained compressed binary files named according
to the day and time they were obtained. We had to identify the required Routing Informa-
tion Base (RIB) files based on the dates the candidate traceroutes were performed. This
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task was automated by having a script to extract the dates from the warts files containing
our candidate traceroutes, and generating a list of RIB files for processing. Each routeviews
RIB was processed with bgpdump [40] for our python script to start the matching process.
Each compressed RIB file contained more than 10 million entries and averaged around 48
megabytes. The processed RIB file is in plain text form and contains details for a given
prefix such as the AS path, origin, next hop, etc. We could then match an IP address in our
traceroute hop to its corresponding prefix and obtain the AS associated with it.
3.2.6 Year-on-Year Comparison
We wanted to know if any of the identified traceroutes in the 2013 dataset exhibited the
same behavior in 2014. Hence, a script was written to search for traceroutes in 2014 that
matched the destination IP address of all identified traceroutes. The generated list was then
sorted according to the 2013 dataset’s order for easy side-by-side viewing. We continued
with the DNS and AS matching to help us understand the results.
3.3 Case Studies of Traceroute Oddities
Here we look at a few case studies known to portray traceroute oddities. These case studies
present us an opportunity to use the above inconsistencies as test criteria. Not all cases
mean to deceive the prober on the actual network topology. Some of them are treated as
gags, as their purpose is to spread a message compared to actual topology deception where
the desire is to influence an adversary.
3.3.1 The Pirate Bay
Deception benefits from obscurity in that there is a lower likelihood of discovery. Publiciz-
ing a topology deception on the Internet tends to invite open sleuthing. The Pirate Bay was
reported to be operating from North Korea [41] and traceroutes after the announcement
confirmed that the responses ended with a North Korea IP address. The ensuing public-
ity brought more scrutiny on the deception as quick-responding Internet users posted their
analyses to message boards [42] and blogs [43].
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The Pirate Bay case is interesting as it showcases inconsistencies in the traceroute RTT
when compared to a TCP three-way handshake’s RTT. The true latency could be measured
when a direct TCP connection was made to The Pirate Bay’s web server [43]. If the trace-
route RTT and the TCP three-way handshake’s RTT were significantly different, it would be
likely that the web server was actually in a different geographical location than previously
reported by the traceroute RTT. This underscores the belief that traceroute deception can
sometimes be unmasked by using non-traceroute probing methods. The other unmasking
method used was to perform a traceroute to the spoofed IP address in North Korea and
compare the routes [43]. Another intriguing point was the use of spoofed IP addresses
which the deceiver did not own. It was in contrast to the other known ground truths such
as the Christmas Carol in Section 4.4 that had some form of control over the IP addresses
presented in their traceroute replies. The use of spoofed addresses offered greater flexibility
but required more careful attention to mask the inconsistencies, as shown above.
We search for traceroutes pertaining to The Pirate Bay case (194.71.107.15) in the
2013 IPv4 Routed /24 Topology Dataset, as well as all IP addresses in its /24 prefix
(194.71.107.*). We suspect that there is a chance of other hosted IP addresses in that subnet
with similar form of deception. Next, we match the DNS records and AS paths for further
inspection. Finally, the 2014 dataset may be mined to see if there are any similarities over
time.
3.3.2 Christmas Carol Traceroute
The Christmas Carol traceroute was first publicized in reddit [7] as a holiday themed gag.
It utilized reversed DNS names to IP addresses in the 82.133.91.0/25 subnet. Compared to
the earlier Pirate Bay case, the IP addresses in the probe replies were real and not spoofed.
Although DNS PTR names hint at an unofficial source, it was not known how the routing
was accomplished. Since the gag is still operational, we perform a variety of traceroutes
using different protocols to see if the gag topology holds. In addition, we probe the individ-
ual IP addresses in between and observe whether the route traveled is similar. Figure 3.1

























Figure 3.1: Cropped traceroute output for xmas.futile.net.
3.3.3 Star Wars Traceroute
The Star Wars traceroute presented an opening crawl themed message crafted from reversed
DNS names in an unused 206.214.251.0/24 subnet [3]. Unfortunately, Werber had termi-
nated the experiment due to a denial of service attack soon after publicizing it. Figure 3.3
shows a portion of the traceroute output containing the opening crawl.
Werber’s original setup included two Cisco 1841 Integrated Services Routers with VRF
configured to bounce packets between each other. VRF lets the operator define multiple
instances of a routing table on a router without introducing conflict due to IP address
reuse [4], as referenced in Figure 3.3. He forwarded the packets at his border router
(216.81.59.173) to one of the Cisco routers with VRF, which then forwards the packet

















Figure 3.2: Cropped traceroute output for obiwan.scryne.net.
Cisco routers then pass the packets back and forth from each other until the end of the rout-
ing table has been reached. The length of the message shown is dependent on the length
of the routing table on each router. By updating the DNS PTR records with separate parts
of the Star Wars opening crawl, the reverse DNS lookups will show the complete message
when all IP addresses have been matched to their respective DNS PTRs.
3.3.4 CMAND Experimental DeTracer
The DeTracer tool had the ability to spoof traceroute replies for UDP, TCP, ICMP, etc.
[33], in order to counter multiple probe types. We are also aware of the DeTracer generat-
ing reasonably plausible RTTs. As such, we work on identifying other inconsistencies as
detailed in section 3.1. The following are the potential inconsistencies that the DeTracer
may have left out in its implementation:
1. Non-random sequence of IPIDs. As the DeTracer used a single machine and interface
to respond to traceroute probes, it is possible that the reply IPIDs may be consecutive.
2. Fixed topology inferred from responses. If there are multiple ingress points for a
probe to arrive at the DeTracer, and it was tasked to present a fixed network topology,
probing results showing identical IP address chains after a certain hop could clue us
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Figure 3.3: Approximate Star Wars gag setup.
on the possibility of deception.
3. Adversarial probing of individual IP addresses in the traceroute replies. We can
attempt to probe each of the IP addresses in the traceroute response to gauge if they





The goal of this thesis is to examine historic traceroute datasets for anomalous results in-
dicative of potential deception, as well as to find evidence of deception by operational
targets. Using the methodology described in Chapter 3, we hope to identify interesting
anomalous patterns in an incremental manner. This chapter presents results from analyzing
the IPv4 Routed /24 Topology Dataset and the individual case studies. We first present
our findings on the 2013 dataset, followed by the 2014 dataset, and a comparison between
findings in both years, before ending with an analysis of the case studies.
4.1 IPv4 Routed /24 Topology Dataset Findings
4.1.1 Findings in the 2013 Dataset
We generated a summary of the 2013 filtered dataset consisting of the consecutive IPID and
duplicate TTL chains, grouped according to the chain lengths. Figure 4.1 shows the count
of LCONSEC and LDCONSEC, inclusive of those traceroutes with 30 or fewer matching
hops. The figure contains a log-based Y-axis due to the volume of traceroutes involved.
(The complete summary, with all data and hops, can be found in the appendix.) There were
LCONSEC chains with up to 699 hops, but they were one-off fringe cases. For instance, the
chain with 699 hops had duplicated IP addresses for the hops that contained consecutive
IPID values. There were also 64,508,982 traceroutes with at least two hops forming a single
LCONSEC chain. These traceroutes consisted of 1.21% of the 5,313,384,228 traceroutes
in the 2013 dataset. The majority of the LCONSEC chains were within 20 hops. 1,613
traceroutes had chains of 20 hops in length or fewer, and just three traceroutes had 21
hop chains. The blue and red bars in Figure 4.1 indicate LCONSEC and LDCONSEC,
respectively. As the LDCONSEC count is a subset of LCONSEC, the number of traceroutes
categorized as LDCONSEC is lower than that of LCONSEC.
Compared to LCONSEC, the LDCONSEC metric showed a drastically reduced set, with
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Figure 4.1: Summary of 2013 dataset containing LCONSEC and LDCONSEC chains of between
1 and 30 hops.
the curve falling off to the low digits after seven hops. There were 39,336,467 (56%) LD-
CONSEC out of 70,026,420 LCONSEC instances. There were only three traceroutes with 
eight LDCONSEC hop chains against 131 traceroutes with seven hop chains. This result 
meant that a significant number of traceroutes had consecutive IPID chains with duplicate 
IP addresses. Table 4.1 shows an example of a traceroute with hops containing duplicate 
IP addresses. The traceroute had a consecutive IPID chain of 2,363 hops which caused it 
to be listed under the ACONSEC category. As the IPID chain was not detected at the end 
of the traceroute, it was not listed under the LCONSEC category. There were 4,066 out of 
4,077 hops with the IP address 118.155.197.13 in the traceroute, and their reply TTLs 
always had a value of 245. The ellipsis represented the sections of the traceroute missing 
as the IP address, probe TTL, and reply TTL did not change. For instance, the hop after the 
first hop with 118.155.197.13, IPID of 16006, probe TTL of 14 and reply TTL of 245, 
had the same 118.155.197.13, probe and reply TTLs as before, but with a consecutive
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addr ipid probettl replyttl rtt
134.197.113.14 2909 1 64 330
134.197.0.33 58371 2 63 325
207.197.33.69 62988 3 62 6633
137.164.26.21 62922 4 61 3504
137.164.25.46 16939 5 60 12903
137.164.25.33 47986 6 59 17572
137.164.26.134 0 7 249 17578
198.71.45.20 0 8 248 50067
208.100.127.34 58550 9 247 55366
208.100.120.26 15989 12 245 61394
198.62.88.194 16005 14 245 63815
118.155.197.13 16006 14 245 65241
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
118.155.197.13 16126 14 245 338371
118.155.197.13 16129 14 245 340390
118.155.197.13 16125 15 245 67025
118.155.197.13 16127 15 245 70111
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
118.155.197.13 20073 15 245 4715190
118.155.197.13 20074 15 245 4717636
118.155.197.13 20075 16 245 67086
Table 4.1: Example of a traceroute to 76.165.200.63 on 12 October 2013
(daily.l7.t2.c002780.20131012.rno-us.warts.gz) containing a long chain of 2,363 hops. Note the
duplicate IP addresses (118.155.197.13) and TTLs (245) in its consecutive IPID chain (16005-
20075).
IPID of 16007. This continued until the 118.155.197.13 hop with an IPID of 16126, af-
ter which there was a gap in the consecutive numbering. The hops with 118.155.197.13
generally followed a consecutive IPID pattern but the probe TTL value grew from 14 to
15. There were breaks in the IPID pattern which resulted in a shortened consecutive IPID
count. The last hop ended with a probe TTL of 16. With the probe TTL field being only
eight bits long and could only contain a maximum value of 255, it was impossible to obtain
a traceroute response of 4,077 hops. Hence, the anomaly here would likely to be a result of
malfunctioning responses instead of actual deception. This example highlights traceroutes
with high consecutive IPID count without distinct IP addresses. Duplicate IP addresses
might have been caused by load balancing on the responding side as their TTL values are
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identical. It is also possible that router misconfiguration as well as zero TTL forwarding
could lead to the duplication of IP addresses. We noted the ascending RTTs values for each
of the probe TTL, which seemed to reset after a transition to the next probe TTL. Although
scamper uses the Paris traceroute to enhance the probing precision, the results are not al-
ways without flaws due to the possibility of random per-packet load balancing, as noted by
its authors [13]. Unless this historic traceroute phenomenon is still active and reproducible,
it is difficult to find out more information on the possible causes.
.
Figure 4.2: Summary of 2013 dataset containing ACONSEC and ADCONSEC chains of between
1 and 30 hops.
The ACONSEC and ADCONSEC metrics show that the number of traceroutes with ACON-
SEC and ADCONSEC chains of length up to seven hops is proportional to that of the
LCONSEC and LDCONSEC results, as seen in Figure 4.2. These two measurements are
supersets of the earlier LCONSEC and LDCONSEC measurements. They do not distin-
guish between continuous chains occurring at the end of the traceroute and elsewhere. We
observe that at a count of seven hops, there is only a difference of nine traceroutes between
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LDCONSEC (131 traceroutes) and ADCONSEC (141 traceroutes). This observation indi-
cates that the bulk of the continuous consecutive IPID chains transpired at the end of the
responding traceroute. It also steers us towards using only the ADCONSEC output in our
next step of analysis.
.
Figure 4.3: Summary of 2013 dataset containing the largest number of sequential duplicate TTLs
chains (between one and 40 hops)
Figure 4.3 presents the findings on the number of traceroutes containing the largest number
of continuous duplicate TTLs chains of between 1 and 40 hops. We observe a general
downward trend, and there were no large dips in the number of duplicate TTL chains after
a certain number of hops.
4.1.2 Pattern Identification in the 2013 Dataset
Our initial methodology was to only filter the traceroutes with continuous consecutive
IPIDs. However, we noticed that several traceroutes had identical or looping hops with the
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same IP address. We then modified the filter to incorporate a distinct IP address checker,
which produces the LDCONSEC and ADCONSEC results. In doing so, we were able to
narrow down the number of traceroutes where consecutive IPIDs were more likely to be in-
dicative of deception. We selected traceroutes with an ADCONSEC chain count of at least
seven hops to be extracted and analyzed for any major patterns. The choice of seven hops
was based on the summary result, to find a chain length that would produce a small enough
set of traceroutes for more detailed manual analysis. Including only those chains of length
seven or greater reduced the candidate traceroutes to a manageable set size (whereas six or
greater produced thousands of candidates). By selecting chains of seven hops and above,
we are left with 151 traceroutes to analyze. We leave the work of discovering whether the
excluded traceroutes (those outside of the ADCONSEC filter) contain interesting artifacts
to future work.
As we had identified instances of traceroutes with duplicate reply TTLs earlier, our next
course of action was to determine if the duplicate reply TTLs were of use in complimenting
our 151 ADCONSEC traceroutes. For traceroutes with duplicate reply TTLs, we observed
that some of them contain duplicate probe TTLs, as well. The reply TTL is the TTL in
the ICMP packet sent by the responding machine. As there were 71,520 cases of duplicate
TTL chains of seven hops and above, and the ADCONSEC chains tended to fall in number
at around seven hops, we decided, in the interest of time, to leave the task of correlating
these duplicate TTL chains to the possibility of deception to future work.
The 151 traceroutes were identified across 60 unique monitors in three teams with 62% of
all monitors reporting three potentially deceptive traceroutes and below. While the median
was two traceroutes per monitor, the highest number of reported traceroutes from a single
monitor came from the Beijing monitor at 11 traceroutes. There were eight destination
IP addresses belonging to at least two traceroutes and one of them was the destination
for three traceroutes. While the individual source and destination IP addresses could be
reused, every traceroute had a unique pair of source and destination IP addresses. With
these 151 traceroutes identified as containing continuous consecutive IPIDs chains of at
least seven hops, we proceeded to perform the tasks of DNS and AS path matching. For
the AS paths, there was an additional path check which ascertained if there was a link from
one hop to the next by identifying the pair of corresponding AS entries for both hops, and
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combing through the associated RIB file from the same time period as the traceroute to
find the AS pair in the list of all AS paths. Section 3.1.5 describes the exploitation of AS
link discrepancies to provide an additional metric for discovering traceroutes with possible
deception.
4.1.3 Major Patterns in 2013
We discovered a recurring pattern in at least 79 out of the 151 filtered traceroutes. Since the
size of the TTL field is a single byte, the range of possible values a TTL field can hold is
from 0 to 255. Default TTLs are configurable, and the presence of large jumps in the reply
TTL values may indicate different hardware or operating systems. These traceroutes had
a consecutive IPID chain that began with the first two hops using only seven out of eight
bits in their reply TTLs before reverting back to the full eight-bit reply TTLs as before the
appearance of the chain. This could be a natural consequence of the default TTL values
for the machine’s operating system. The third hop in the chain typically resolved to a
DNS name (PTR record) like deploy.static.akamaitechnologies.com belonging to
Akamai Technologies, Inc, as seen in Figure 4.4. Another resolved DNS name contained
airtel.in, which belongs to Akamai Technologies India Pvt Ltd, as it was reported in
a whois lookup. In Figure 4.4, we expected the hop with 63.218.2.53 to have a reply
TTL of 251 as the previous hop had a reply TTL of 252. This would hint at a router with
different default TTL or that there were hidden routers. We observed that the traceroute
did not reach the destination as the last responding hop was not the destination address.
A common accompanying pattern was that the last responding hop usually resolved to a
name containing customer.alter.net. We found that only eight out of 90 traceroutes
with a resolved last hop to a customer.alter.net address did not contain a hop with an
Akamai related name. A whois lookup at this time of writing showed that the alter.net
domain belongs to Verizon Business Global LLC. In addition, there were around five hops
after the hop with the Akamai address. We call this pattern the Akamai pattern for an easy
reference.
Under normal circumstances, the quoted TTL of each hop of an ICMP Time Exceeded
reply in traceroute responses would be a value of one. A router probed by traceroute would
typically decrement the incoming probe TTL by one. If the decremented TTL value was
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Figure 4.4: An Akamai pattern traceroute to 200.123.202.18 on 18 April 2013
(daily.l7.t1.c002479.20130418.mnl-ph.warts.gz) with a hop containing a DNS name related to
Akamai Technologies.
zero, the router would prevent the packet from being forwarded and reply with an ICMP
Time Exceeded datagram instead. Hence, the incoming probe TTL would have to be a
value of one for the packet to be discarded and the ICMP datagram sent as a response.
We discovered the first two hops in the consecutive IPID chain of all traceroutes with the
Akamai pattern had quoted TTLs with values of zero. Augustin et al. described a traceroute
anomaly that if the quoted TTL value of a hop was zero, it could mean the previous router
had a misconfiguration that resulted in packets with a TTL value of zero being forwarded to
the current receiving router [13]. This would suggest that the hop preceding the consecutive
IPID chain in the traceroutes with the Akamai pattern might have forwarded the packet to
the next router even after decrementing the probe TTL to zero, thus causing the responding
hop to have a quoted TTL of zero.
Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) provides a method to speed up router forwarding
in fixed paths by avoiding IP header analysis for every packet [44]. The MPLS architecture
introduces a Label Stack Entry (LSE) header which contains information on the forward-
ing decisions to be made by MPLS routers. An IP router forwarding MPLS traffic through
MPLS routers would insert the LSE header before the IP header in the packet to be for-
warded. The LSE header contains its own TTL field. Upon receiving a packet, the MPLS
router will decrement the TTL value in the LSE header and not the TTL field in the IP
header, unless the ttl-propagate option is active. The ttl-propagate option in most
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Figure 4.5: An Akamai pattern traceroute to 200.123.202.18 on 18 April 2013
(daily.l7.t1.c002479.20130418.mnl-ph.warts.gz) showing hops with a quoted TTL value of zero.
routers ensures that the TTL in the original IP packet will be copied to the TTL field in the
LSE header. This allows MPLS routers to respond with ICMP Time Exceeded replies to
traceroute probes. Donnet et al. showed that MPLS tunnels with the ttl-propagate op-
tion enabled in their MPLS routers would still result in hops with quoted TTLs of one [45].
Therefore, a typical traceroute would contain hops with quoted TTL values of one. The
quoted TTL could have a value of more than one if the traceroute probe terminates at a
responding MPLS router with ttl-propagate enabled, and replies with an ICMP Time
Exceeded datagram containing the quoted TTL value. The effect is that quoted TTLs above
a value of one are likely indicative of the number of MPLS routers in the route. The pres-
ence of the quoted TTLs of values zero and more than one may not suggest real deception.
They may possibly be merely artifacts of MPLS routing or router misconfiguration and
incorrect implementation. We leave this identification of the causes to future work.
A variation of the above Akamai pattern involved a third hop with an unresolved DNS
name or belonging to ISPs such as seed.net.tw, merca.net.co, etc. At times, the IPID
chain would end after the first two hops with the two-digit TTL values, only to resume the
sequence soon after. These mixed cases comprised of approximately 10% of the filtered
traceroutes.
The second recurring pattern had 14 cases of consecutive IPID chains with IP addresses reg-
ularly within the 14.43.0.* and 14.43.2.* range. Figure 4.6 showed the last and second
last hops before the consecutive IPID chain were always non-zero and zero IPID values,
respectively. The reply TTLs in the chain were mostly identical, with an outlier traceroute
39
Figure 4.6: A Korean Telecom pattern traceroute to 14.43.2.108 on 26 January 2013
(daily.l7.t1.c002346.20130126.cjj-kr.warts.gz) with IPID chains with IP ranges in 14.43.0.*
and 14.43.2.*.
having multiple duplicated TTLs in this chain. The trend for 10 of the 14 cases was to have
the first hop of the consecutive IPID chain to be 14.43.0.18, followed by 14.43.0.28,
14.43.0.34, the sixth hop being 14.43.0.137, and the seventh hop being 14.43.0.138.
The chain length tended to be eight hops long. This little pattern would vary slightly in the
later 2014 dataset, as detailed in Section 4.1.4. Although we were unable to resolve their
DNS names, a current whois lookup revealed that the 14.32.0.0—14.95.255.255 range
belonged to Korea Telecom. Hence, we identified this trend as the Korean Telecom pattern.
While the Korean Telecom pattern had the probes traversing through the IP ranges in
14.43.0.* and 14.43.2.*, another variation of this pattern used IP addresses based in
China. We performed a whois lookup and found that the addresses belonged to Chinese
companies such as China Telecom and China Mobile. All 13 traceroutes with this pattern
continued to have duplicate TTL values in their IPID chains. An interesting subpattern was
the appearance of a private address in the 10.10.0.0/16 subnet in four cases as evident in
Figure 4.7. We therefore termed this pattern as the China Telecom pattern.
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Figure 4.7: A China Telecompattern traceroute to 27.98.220.193 on 7 January 2013
(daily.l7.t2.c002316.20130107.pek-cn.warts.gz) with IPID chains with IP addresses assigned to
China.
4.1.4 Looking Ahead in 2014
We matched the identified traceroutes in 2013 against their equivalents in the 2014 dataset.
The matching was done by comparing the destination IP address and not the source IP
address. The source IP address are different due to the random selection of destination
addresses by each team in an Ark probing cycle, as detailed in Section 2.4. Figure 4.8
highlights an example in the 2014 dataset for our identified traceroutes in the 2013 dataset.
The reply TTL value drop was still present but the long consecutive IPID chains were
nowhere to be found. We observed that some of the destination addresses belonging to
the Akamai pattern in the 2013 dataset had their *.alter.net hops replaced with hops
of different IP address that resolved to *.level3.net. There was substantial variation in
the routing topology of the filtered traceroutes over the 2014 period as we extracted dis-
parate routes from traceroute destinations with multiple probing dates. In one instance,
a traceroute from 119.40.82.245 to 157.238.81.44 on 9 March 2014 had its last few
responding hops with a *.cincinnati1.level3.net address, while another traceroute
from 200.160.7.159 to the same 157.238.81.44 on 13 May 2014 had different IP ad-
dresses resolved to *.alter.net instead. Additionally, we noted the continuity of the drop
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in reply TTL values despite the changes in the IP addresses.
Figure 4.8: Traceroute to 200.123.202.18 on 20 January 2014
(daily.l7.t2.c002955.20140120.hnl-us.warts) in the 2014 dataset, compared with the ear-
lier traceroute in 2013, showing a modified topology and fragmented IPID values.
For the Korean Telecom pattern, there was also increased fragmentation in the IPID values
such that there were fewer long continuous consecutive IPID chains. These newer tracer-
outes retained their duplicate TTL values in their IPID chains. However, most chains were
merely sequential, having hops that skipped an incremented IPID value, as shown in Fig-
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TRACEROUTE=150.183.95.135 => 14.43.2.108
addr ipid probe reply dns
ttl ttl
134.75.23.17 61713 1 255 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
134.75.23.1 44552 2 254 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
134.75.20.252 3790 3 253 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
134.75.1.6 20974 4 252 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
134.75.13.2 49648 5 251 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
128.134.40.249 52792 6 250 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
112.174.36.17 46147 7 249 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
112.174.15.190 45527 8 248 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
112.174.234.174 34285 9 247 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
112.174.177.2 0 10 246 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
222.97.96.18 58409 11 245 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
14.43.0.18 61468 12 244 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
14.43.0.28 61469 13 244 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
14.43.0.34 61470 14 244 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
14.43.0.42 61471 15 244 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
14.43.2.22 61472 16 244 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
14.43.0.137 61473 17 244 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
14.43.0.138 61474 18 244 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
14.43.2.22 61475 19 244 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
TRACEROUTE=192.87.102.98 => 14.43.2.108
addr ipid probe reply dns
ttl ttl
192.87.102.97 31969 1 255 vl163.sw14.amsterdam1.surf.net
145.145.19.169 0 2 254 ae3.1131.jnr01.asd001a.surf.net
195.69.145.150 59894 3 61 30gigabitethernet1-3.core1.ams1.he.net
72.52.92.213 38334 4 61 100ge9-1.core1.lon2.he.net
72.52.92.166 19597 5 60 100ge1-1.core1.nyc4.he.net
72.52.92.226 6714 6 59 10ge10-3.core1.lax1.he.net
184.105.246.198 0 7 249 koreatelecom.10gigabitethernet12-7.
core1.lax1.he.net
112.174.87.209 0 8 249 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
112.174.83.117 0 9 248 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
112.174.8.121 44530 10 248 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
112.174.15.242 15644 11 247 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
112.174.235.174 14575 12 246 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
112.174.177.2 0 13 245 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
222.97.96.18 17037 14 244 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
14.43.0.20 18249 15 243 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
14.43.0.28 18250 16 243 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
14.43.0.36 18253 17 243 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
14.43.0.42 18255 18 243 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
14.43.2.22 18256 19 243 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
14.43.0.137 18258 20 243 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
14.43.0.138 18259 21 243 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
77.67.67.138 18260 22 243 art-gw.ip4.gtt.net
Figure 4.9: Traceroute to 14.43.2.108 on 8 March 2014 (daily.l7.t2.c003039.20140308.ams-
nl.warts.gz) in the 2014 dataset, compared with the earlier traceroute in 2013.
ure 4.9. The 14.43.0.18 pattern first observed in Section 4.1.3 continued to appear with a
slight variation. While the first, sixth, and seventh hops contained the same IP addresses as
before, the second and third hops could have different IP addresses. The maximum number
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of hops for the sequential IPID chain was still eight hops.
The China Telecom pattern experienced substantial changes in that the IPID chains and du-
plicate TTLs were no longer seen in traceroutes with hops containing the bjtelecom.net
domain. Figure 4.10 represents the general changes in the 2014 dataset. While the route
in the later traceroute was different, it did not exhibit a large series of hops with duplicate
TTLs and its IPID values were not consecutive.
TRACEROUTE=218.241.107.98 => 27.98.220.193
addr ipid probe reply dns
ttl ttl
218.241.107.97 23496 1 255 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
192.168.1.253 0 2 253 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
159.226.253.73 0 3 252 8.130
159.226.253.110 0 4 251 8.214
10.10.14.12 4093 6 248 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
218.205.154.109 4474 8 248 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
221.179.171.29 4475 9 248 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
211.136.94.42 4476 10 248 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
211.136.94.41 4477 11 248 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
221.179.171.129 4478 12 248 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
221.176.19.33 4479 13 248 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
221.176.15.82 4480 14 248 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
202.97.15.177 4481 15 248 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
202.97.57.157 4483 16 248 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
219.141.131.153 4874 18 248 bj141-131-153.bjtelecom.net
219.141.130.14 4875 19 248 bj141-130-14.bjtelecom.net
TRACEROUTE=205.166.205.222 => 27.98.220.193
addr ipid probe reply dns
ttl ttl
205.166.205.221 61665 1 255 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
128.171.64.18 0 2 253 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
74.202.119.9 0 3 252 74-202-119-9.static.twtelecom.net
66.192.249.22 0 4 249 sjc1-pr1-xe-0-3-0-0.us.twtelecom.net
64.132.69.106 12958 5 249 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
202.97.90.73 23965 6 249 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
202.97.52.249 19444 7 249 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
202.97.53.241 54685 8 248 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
202.97.53.41 36986 9 247 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
219.141.162.174 621 10 246 bj141-162-174.bjtelecom.net
219.141.130.18 47986 11 245 bj141-130-18.bjtelecom.net
Figure 4.10: Traceroute to 27.98.220.193 on 5 January 2014
(daily.l7.t2.c002926.20140105.hnl-us.warts.gz) in the 2014 datasets, compared with the ear-
lier traceroute in 2013.
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4.1.5 Limitations
A limitation of our continuous consecutive IPID filter was that continuous sequential but
not consecutive chains were left out after the initial round of filtering. These could be long
chains that had hops which did not have IPID values that conformed to the desired pattern.
The hops might be exhibiting IPID values that incremented in small steps of greater than
one, or had a few hops with duplicate IPID values as the previous hop. Some of the stepped
values could be attributed to non-responsive hops, causing a small jump in the IPID value.
4.2 The Pirate Bay and Company
The original Pirate Bay destination IP address published in the reports on traceroute
deception was 194.71.107.15 [41]. The blogger Will, noted on 5th March 2013,
that his traceroute from his machine at 84.116.229.73 to 194.71.107.15 was ending
with 202.72.96.6 in Phenom Penh, Cambodia, followed by 175.45.177.217 in Py-
ongyang, North Korea [9]. In our CAIDA 2013 dataset, we found a traceroute from
200.160.7.159 to 194.71.107.15 on 15th May 2013, and while the last responding hop
was 175.45.177.217, the second last connecting hop was instead 219.158.32.174, as
shown in Figure 4.11. A whois lookup shows that IP address 219.158.32.174 currently
points to a location in China. Both traceroutes converge at the hop with the common IP
address 213.198.77.122 and diverge as the subsequent IP addresses differ. They have
the same 175.45.177.217 in their last hops. The IP addresses in between the hops with
213.198.77.122 and 175.45.177.217 were unique and not reused by each other.
The CAIDA traceroute displayed a generally monotonically increasing series of RTT val-
ues, which was expected with typical traceroutes. The reply TTLs had irregularities such
as duplicate, missing, and rising reply TTLs. The hops containing 129.250.9.50 and
217.149.32.206 had the same reply TTL value of 241. The reply TTL for the hop with
217.149.32.206 was 241, but the next hop (213.206.128.184) had a reply TTL value
of 243. There was also a case of a skipped TTL between the hops of 129.250.5.174 with
a TTL of 247 and 129.250.2.64 with a TTL of 245.
The hop with IP address 213.198.77.122 had a markedly different base reply TTL from
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TRACEROUTE=200.160.7.159 => 194.71.107.15
addr ipid probe reply rtt dns
ttl ttl
200.160.7.252 0 1 255 208 ae1-11.ar4.nu.registro.br
200.160.0.253 0 2 254 1325 ae0-0.core1.nu.registro.br
200.160.0.163 0 3 253 23446 xe-5-0-0-0.core1.gc.registro.br
200.160.0.175 0 4 252 1419 xe-0-0-0-0.gw1.gc.registro.br
159.63.48.37 0 5 251 1661 ge-2-0-1.ar4.gru1.gblx.net
67.16.132.10 25570 6 248 170223 po1-20g.ar2.mia2.gblx.net
67.16.132.10 25712 7 248 185586 po1-20g.ar2.mia2.gblx.net
129.250.9.117 56356 8 247 130710 xe-0-0-0-10.r05.miamfl02.us.bb.gin.
ntt.net
129.250.2.184 56305 9 248 119777 ae-4.r20.miamfl02.us.bb.gin.ntt.net
129.250.2.99 16357 10 246 160994 ae-8.r21.asbnva02.us.bb.gin.ntt.net
129.250.2.145 2796 11 244 253019 ae-2.r23.amstnl02.nl.bb.gin.ntt.net
129.250.2.159 61266 12 241 235343 ae-2.r02.amstnl02.nl.bb.gin.ntt.net
129.250.2.65 33216 13 244 211509 xe-4-1.r02.dsdfge01.de.bb.gin.ntt.net
129.250.5.173 18466 14 247 236615 xe-3-4.r00.dsdfge02.de.bb.gin.ntt.net
213.198.77.122 9328 15 57 213572 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
129.250.5.174 32801 17 247 238479 xe-3-2.r02.dsdfge01.de.bb.gin.ntt.net
129.250.2.64 2443 18 245 254946 xe-0-1-0-20.r02.amstnl02.nl.bb.gin.
ntt.net
129.250.9.50 19774 19 241 242506 xe-0.sprint.amstnl02.nl.bb.gin.ntt.net
217.149.32.206 1007 20 241 244541 sl-bb21-ams-0-0-0.sprintlink.net
213.206.129.143 11726 21 243 256363 sl-bb23-lon-0-4-0-0.sprintlink.net
213.206.128.184 62431 22 242 258374 sl-crs2-lon-0-8-0-0.sprintlink.net
144.232.9.163 61842 23 241 318459 sl-crs1-nyc-0-5-2-0.sprintlink.net
144.232.5.216 14702 24 240 338347 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
144.232.18.59 20290 25 239 338393 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
144.232.1.73 42899 26 238 344416 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
144.232.11.17 24182 27 237 382504 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
144.232.12.41 19465 28 236 362183 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
144.232.7.124 43185 29 235 365264 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
144.232.18.106 23270 30 234 393365 sl-st20-sj-0-0-0.sprintlink.net
144.223.242.82 8874 31 233 613360 sl-china6-192107-0.sprintlink.net
219.158.32.174 31587 32 232 700001 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
175.45.177.217 59715 33 231 693447 FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
Figure 4.11: Traceroute to The Pirate Bay (194.71.107.15) on 15 May 2013
(daily.l7.t1.c002522.20130515.sao-br.warts.gz) in the 2013 dataset.
the rest of the hops. It had a seven-bit value compared to the eight-bit values in the rest of
the hops, which was suggestive of either a router misconfiguration or more likely a different
operating system. Moreover, the path after 213.198.77.122 had been modified such that
the IP addresses were different, but in general, they were inferring a route through the
United States to North Korea, as per the route in Will’s blog from Germany to the United
States, next to Cambodia, and lastly to North Korea [9]. One plausible reason would be
that the deceptive topology had been modified to erase the inconsistency that there could
not be any direct link between Cambodia and North Korea at that time. According to Will,
a real AS link from Cambodia to North Korea did not exist [9]. We found that the AS links
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TRACEROUTE=200.160.7.159 => 194.71.107.15
addr ipid probe reply rtt aspath
ttl ttl
200.160.7.252 0 1 255 208 22548 [Same AS]
200.160.0.253 0 2 254 1325 22548 [Same AS]
200.160.0.163 0 3 253 23446 22548 [Same AS]
200.160.0.175 0 4 252 1419 22548 [22548 3549]
159.63.48.37 0 5 251 1661 3549 [Same AS]
67.16.132.10 25570 6 248 170223 3549 [Same AS]
67.16.132.10 25712 7 248 185586 3549 [3549 2914]
129.250.9.117 56356 8 247 130710 2914 [Same AS]
129.250.2.184 56305 9 248 119777 2914 [Same AS]
129.250.2.99 16357 10 246 160994 2914 [Same AS]
129.250.2.145 2796 11 244 253019 2914 [Same AS]
129.250.2.159 61266 12 241 235343 2914 [Same AS]
129.250.2.65 33216 13 244 211509 2914 [Same AS]
129.250.5.173 18466 14 247 236615 2914 [Same AS]
213.198.77.122 9328 15 57 213572 2914 [Same AS]
129.250.5.174 32801 17 247 238479 2914 [Same AS]
129.250.2.64 2443 18 245 254946 2914 [Same AS]
129.250.9.50 19774 19 241 242506 2914 [2914 1239]
217.149.32.206 1007 20 241 244541 1239 [Same AS]
213.206.129.143 11726 21 243 256363 1239 [Same AS]
213.206.128.184 62431 22 242 258374 1239 [Same AS]
144.232.9.163 61842 23 241 318459 1239 [Same AS]
144.232.5.216 14702 24 240 338347 1239 [Same AS]
144.232.18.59 20290 25 239 338393 1239 [Same AS]
144.232.1.73 42899 26 238 344416 1239 [Same AS]
144.232.11.17 24182 27 237 382504 1239 [Same AS]
144.232.12.41 19465 28 236 362183 1239 [Same AS]
144.232.7.124 43185 29 235 365264 1239 [Same AS]
144.232.18.106 23270 30 234 393365 1239 [Same AS]
144.223.242.82 8874 31 233 613360 1239 [1239 4837]
219.158.32.174 31587 32 232 700001 4837 [4837 131279]
175.45.177.217 59715 33 231 693447 131279
Figure 4.12: Traceroute to The Pirate Bay (194.71.107.15) with matching AS path data and
links in the 2013 dataset.
between each hop in the CAIDA traceroute were feasible and connected according to the
historic RIB data in Figure 4.12. The difference was that the Cambodian IP address was
replaced by a Chinese IP address which belonged to a valid upstream AS for the North
Korea IP address. This possibility could be further augmented by the fact that there was a
time period of at least a month between the traceroute, suggesting Will’s findings discussing
a Cambodian link conducted on 4 March 2013, and the CAIDA traceroute conducted later
on 15 May 2013. This would have provided an opportunity to tweak the deception to
be more convincing. Our later search in the 194.71.107.0/24 subnet space discovered
that traceroutes prior to 5 March 2013 did not have ending hops with 175.45.177.217 as
evidenced in our subsequent findings. The CAIDA traceroute to 194.71.107.15 had little
or no obvious inconsistencies such as duplicate TTLs and consecutive IPIDs. Subsequent
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analysis in this section shows that this IP played a major role in the topology deception.
We were unable to obtain a resolved DNS name for 213.198.77.122. A whois lookup
shows that 213.198.77.122 is under NTT America.
Figure 4.13: Traceroute to 194.71.107.251 on 24 November 2013
(daily.l7.t2.c002850.20131124.rno-us.warts.gz) in the 2013 Dataset.
An exhaustive search of CAIDA traceroutes in the 194.71.107.0/24 subnet was per-
formed using the 2013 dataset. We discovered that the topology deception was more ex-
tensive than previously thought. There were 128 cases of traceroutes that contained a hop
with the 213.198.77.122 IP address and subsequent series of hops were either 17 or 18
hops long. The phenomenon was observed in traceroutes to the 194.71.107.0/24 subnet
in our 2013 and 2014 datasets from 5 March 2013 to 10 December 2014 (645 days). The
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reported traceroute dates with the phenomenon meant that the deception had been active for
at least 1 year, 9 months, and 5 days. For instance, a traceroute from 129.119.99.169 to
194.71.107.82 on 1 October 2014 had the series of hops with 213.198.77.122, while
another traceroute from 216.66.30.102 to 194.71.107.82 on 20 December 2014 no
longer exhibited this phenomenon. This was consistent with the date that The Pirate Bay
was supposedly taken down in a police raid on its servers in Stockholm on 9 December
2014 [46]. Interestingly, the later traceroutes to 194.71.107.15 on both 2 February and
22 February 2014 did not have any deception in place. These series of hops had identical
IP addresses except that the series with 18 hops had an additional hop at 31.172.1.10 in
between 213.198.77.122 and the common 17-hop series. There were 110 instances of
17-hop series and 18 instances of 18-hop series. Figure 4.13 presents an 18-hop series that
includes 31.172.1.10. In a typical 17-hop series, the hop with 213.198.77.122 exhib-
ited a low seven-bit reply TTL while in the 18-hop series, hops with 31.172.1.10 had this
characteristic and 213.198.77.122 had a TTL that was also a seven-bit value. There were
changes in some of the routes over the period of 2013. For instance, the CAIDA traceroute
to 194.71.107.251 on 22 April 2013 contained a 17-hop series. The next traceroute on
24 November 2013 contained an 18-hop series with the additional hop of 31.172.1.10 as
shown in Figure 4.13. Another instance of varying results for a destination IP address was
the traceroutes for 194.71.107.241. In this case, a 17-hop series was found dating back
to 1 June 2013 while an 18-hop series was identified on 6th December 2013. We identified
five of such occurrences where there was a transition from 17-hop series to the 18-hop se-
ries that were present in traceroutes obtained at a later date (i.e., we then observed an extra
hop in deceptive portion of the traceroute).
A further inspection of historic CAIDA traceroutes to the 194.71.107.0/24 indicated that
195.69.147.245 was another major IP address involved in the deception. We counted
46 instances with a 17-hop series, where 195.69.147.245 replaced 213.198.77.122 as
the sole hop before the long IP series of hops. Similarly, there were two more instances
with 195.69.147.245 that had 18-hop series and they included 31.172.1.10 as the first
hop in the series of hops. With the historic CAIDA DNS dataset, 195.69.147.245 was
resolved to ams-ix.as39138.net. The discovery of a second major IP address involved in
the deception process led us to continue analyzing the 194.71.107.0/24 subnet. We
noticed a small number of IP addresses such as 184.105.213.101 and 194.146.118.105
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Figure 4.14: An instance of reply TTLs for traceroutes that end with 175.45.177.217.
that preceded the 17-hop series. In every traceroute that ended with the North Korean IP
address 175.45.177.217, there would be a response probe that contained a reply TTL that
consisted of two digits, as shown in Figure 4.14. The common 17-hop series meant that
a fixed network topology was presented to incoming probes. It also revealed that probes
from multiple vantage points collected the same network topology regardless of their actual
geographical distance and that the route required a traversal through Europe and the North
American continent.
As a result of The Pirate Bay service being taken down [46], we were unable to probe
the service directly for more details. Our next step was to ascertain whether the historic
CAIDA traceroute to 175.45.177.217 had any similarities with the 194.71.107.0/24
traceroutes. 175.45.177.217 was the IP address in North Korea which was the last re-
sponding hop in traceroutes to The Pirate Bay prior to its demise. From Figure 4.15, the
175.45.177.217 did not contain any of the hops in the common 17-hop series that existed
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in traceroutes to IP addresses in the 194.71.107.0/24 subnet. Given that a direct trace-
route showed a completely separate route, it would have made the inferred topology based
on the 17-hop series highly suspicious even if we did not know about the actual deceit in
the first place.
Figure 4.15: Traceroute to 175.45.177.217 on 5 July 2013 (daily.l7.t2.c002608.20130705.yow-
ca.warts.gz) in the 2013 Dataset.
4.3 Star Wars
As the Star Wars traceroute was no longer operational, we could only rely on historic trace-
routes from the CAIDA IPv4 Routed /24 Topology Dataset. Based on the 2013 dataset,
we observed the characteristics of traceroute probes bouncing between two routers with a
VRF setup. There was a fixed series of 47 hops whose IP addresses fell within the same
206.214.251.0/24 subnet. There were three main patterns that stood out in this tracer-
oute: a) incremental IP addresses, b) dual incremental IPID sequences, and c) duplicate
TTL values. The IP addresses appeared in the traceroute responses in an ascending order
beginning from 206.214.251.1. The IP address sequence also alternated between incre-
menting by a value of three and five for each hop. We considered two separate hop streams
with alternating IP addresses and IPID flows. The first stream began at 206.214.251.1
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Figure 4.16: Traceroute to The Pirate Bay (194.71.107.15) on 22 February 2014
(daily.l7.t3.c003012.20140222.her-gr.warts.gz) in the 2014 Dataset.
with subsequent hops increasing the last octet value by eight. Its IPID sequence started
from 58775 and increased between one and five values for every subsequent hop. Simi-
larly, the second stream began at 205.214.251.6 with the same increasing last octet by
eight, and its IPID sequence started from 48277 onwards with an increase of between one
and four for every next hop. As we could not probe the system for further information,
we suggest that the randomness in the IPID advancement could be attributed to the routers
replying to other external probes at the same time. These two streams corresponded with
the published inner workings of the gag in the Star Wars author’s blog [3]. The reply TTL
values were equivalent throughout the two-stream chain as a result of the default route in
his original design. Lastly, the RTT had a range between 194 ms and 207 ms and a standard
deviation of 4 ms for the hops in the 206.214.251.0/24 subnet. The short RTT presented
a reasonable picture of an internal network.
We observed the same alternating patterns in all four historic traceroutes from the 2014
dataset, as well as three from the ongoing 2015 datasets. Our original methodology did not
search for any potential traceroutes of this alternating IPID nature in the historic CAIDA
datasets. As such, the Star Wars traceroutes were completely ignored in our filtering of the
datasets. The traceroutes in 2014 and 2015 datasets too had varying randomness in their
IPID advancements. Figure 4.18 shows the change in IPID values for each of the two alter-
nating hop streams we considered in one of the Star Wars traceroutes in the 2014 dataset.
The chart indicated no discernible pattern other than that the IPIDs were increasing mono-
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Figure 4.17: Partial Star Wars Traceroute (216.81.59.173) on 27th July 2013
(daily.l7.t2.c002647.20130727.cmn-ma.warts.gz) in the 2013 Dataset showing sequential and du-
plication patterns.
tonically. We did not find a constant difference in any of the Star Wars traceroutes in all
datasets. The origin points in the 2014 dataset included China, Indonesia, and Spain. The
use of multiple vantage points and their similar results concluded that there was no dynamic
topology variance. Furthermore, as the subnet addresses belonged to Epik Networks [47],
an ISP based in North America, there were no telltale signs of unfeasible routes from other
continents like the Pirate Bay example in Section 4.2. Another noteworthy point was that
the IP addresses used belonged to an unused, non-routed /24 network for which the gag
creator had access to. The gag did not require IP address spoofing, unlike The Pirate Bay
case. This access not only allowed Werber to generate reverse DNS names based on the
Star Wars theme, but also to leverage upon their inaccessibility. Hence, pings to the IP ad-
dresses in the 206.214.251.0/24 subnet had no responses and the corresponding CAIDA
traceroutes did not show a route through the 206.214.251.* address used in the gag.
Interestingly, the last responding hop at the end of each historic Star Wars traceroute in
all datasets had a distinct IP address. For example, one traceroute conducted on 25th July
2014 yielded a *.comcast.net address, and another traceroute on 19th January 2015 had
a *.corp.gq1.yahoo.com address as seen in Figure 4.19. By performing a whois lookup
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Figure 4.18: Change in IPID values for each hop stream in a Star Wars traceroute to
216.81.59.173 on 16th December 2014 (daily.l7.t3.c003700.20141216.she-cn.warts.gz) in the
2014 dataset.
on the last responding hop addresses of the historic Star Wars traceroutes in all datasets,
we found that the IP addresses were unique and belonged to organizations in the United
States, China, Macau, and Bosnia. Although the Star Wars opening crawl was the original
intriguing feature of this case, we postulate that the peculiarity of the last hop might suggest
a redirection to a random IP address, and it could be worth a future investigation.
4.4 Inside the Christmas Carol
The Christmas Carol traceroute was advertised as a holiday themed gag by MyssT [7] on
Christmas Eve in 2014 some time after the initial release of the Star Wars themed traceroute
gag. Therefore, we were not able to obtain traceroutes containing the spoofed topology in
the 2013 and 2014 datasets. However, the gag is still operational and we are able to probe it
directly. Unlike the Star Wars traceroute gag, there was no blog or article that described the
Christmas Carol traceroute’s inner workings. Instead, we discovered an Internet Relay Chat
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Figure 4.19: Comparison of last seven hops to 216.81.59.173 on 19th January 2015
(daily.l7.t1.c003767.20150119.san-us.warts.gz) in the 2015 dataset.
(IRC) archive which supposedly contains the creator’s comments that the fake topology was
implemented using iptables [48] and Perl extensions instead of the Star Wars traceroute’s
original VRF design [49]. As such, we would not expect to see alternating hop streams
with duplicated TTL values.
Figure 4.20 shows the last 14 hops of the operational Christmas Carol traceroute on 11
June 2015. We performed a series of traceroutes based on options available in Scamper
such as UDP, UDP-Paris, ICMP, ICMP-Paris, TCP, and TCP-ACK. We also extracted a
historic CAIDA traceroute to 77.75.106.106 on 28 March 2015. As we were aware that
there would be a chain of IP addresses within a certain subnet, we quickly located a series
of continuous hops in the general 82.133.91.0/25 block, starting from 77.75.106.106
and ending with 82.133.91.51. A whois lookup showed that the 82.133.91.0/24 block
was owned by Tiscali UK, now known as TalkTalk, a telecommunications company [50].
There were 80 hops in the subnet and the RTTs were averaging around 164 ms with a
standard deviation of 2 ms. The IPID sequences did not exhibit any obvious pattern like
the alternating or consecutive values. Similarly, the TTLs were decrementing accordingly.
The traceroutes ended with the original destination 77.75.106.106. We observed that
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Figure 4.20: Partial traceroute to xmas.futile.net (77.75.106.106) on 11 June 2015.
while the chain containing the 82.133.91.0/25 block had three-digit reply TTL values,
the preceding and final hops had two-digit TTLs.
TRACEROUTE=192.168.1.112 => 77.75.106.106
addr ipid probe reply rtt aspath
ttl ttl
...
93.89.84.75 44972 20 44 306767 39326 [39326 9105 Not Found]
82.133.91.37 212 21 234 327331 9105 [Same AS]
82.133.91.18 57600 22 233 287368 9105 [Same AS]
...
82.133.91.11 31949 99 156 307860 9105 [Same AS]
82.133.91.51 33955 100 155 307253 9105 [9105 39326 Not Found]
77.75.106.106 41824 101 43 307496 39326
Figure 4.21: Partial traceroute to xmas.futile.net (77.75.106.106) with matching AS links
on 11th June 2015.
We performed traceroutes from both the North and South American continents and noticed
the same fixed route through the 82.133.91.0/25 subnet. This fixed route meant that
we could not utilize the technique of finding routing circuits that was described in Section
3.1.2. Circuits in traceroutes suggest a routing inefficiency or deliberate manipulation.
Compared with the Star Wars traceroute, multiple vantage points did not contribute much
as every last hop’s IP address was identical throughout. Our pings and traceroutes to the IP
addresses in the subnet involved returned non-responses. A possible reason would be the
creator’s use of unused IP addresses as seen earlier in the Star Wars traceroute. Figure 4.21
shows the results of our AS matching. It found that based on the RIB records, there were
no AS links between the hop before the subnet chain and the subnet chain itself, as well as
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the subnet chain and the last hop. The lack of direct AS links suggested that the route was
not real.
4.5 Unmasking the DeTracer
The DeTracer’s goal was to present an arbitrary false network topology to an adversary
trying to map the defender’s network [33]. The DeTracer was operational for a period of
time before its infrastructure was taken down. The DeTracer could respond to probes by
presenting a static network topology or generating random IP addresses for each distinct
traceroute. While the DeTracer was configured to present a static topology, we probed it
with Scamper using ICMP, UDP, and TCP. Figure 4.22 shows the normal route generated
when the deception feature was disabled.
Figure 4.22: Traceroute to 38.68.239.58 with no deception in place.
Figure 4.23: Partial traceroute to 38.68.239.58 with fixed deceptive topology enabled.
Figure 4.23 is an example of a fixed topology deception. All our probes reported that
an identical topology based on the source IP addresses of the return packets. The decep-
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tion was observed to begin after 38.68.239.100, and contained obvious patterns such as
identical IPID and TTL values. The deception hop chain had spoofed IP addresses belong-
ing to various destinations. For instance, whois lookups showed that the probes traversed
through 38.68.239.100 (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University), followed
by 64.69.48.1 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security), 101.16.13.1 (China Unicom),
175.45.176.55 (Star Joint Venture Co.), 112.91.128.17 (China Unicom), and back to
the Virginia Tech. Our AS path matcher determined that although there was a link between
the China Unicom and North Korean IP addresses, there were no direct connections to the
North American IP addresses before and after. This was in conjunction with the original
deception topology as covered by West [33]. If the route contained additional hops whose
IP addresses could bridge the broken AS links, a casual observer only looking at the AS
links alone might have accepted the deceptive topology as the truth. Compared to the Star
Wars traceroute in Section 4.3 and the Christmas Carol traceroute in Section 4.4, the use
of spoofed IP addresses in the Pirate Bay traceroute was similar to the DeTracer’s. It also
allowed us to probe the the individual IP addresses and discover conflicting topologies. If
the choice of IP addresses resulted in a looped cross-continent route even when multiple
vantage points were used, it would then indicate a manipulated route.
Figure 4.24 demonstrates the outcome of the DeTracer configured to spoof random IP ad-
dresses in its replies to incoming probes. Each of our traceroutes resulted in a different
set of IP addresses in its deception chain. We were able to recognize the duplicated IPID
and TTL values. Tellingly, the IPID values in the deception chain for the both the static
and dynamic topologies were identical and always a value of one. Another obvious pattern
would be the RTTs advancing steadily from 149 ms to 588 ms in the deception chain, only
to revert to a low RTT of 88 ms in the last hop. This was unlike the fixed topology config-
uration where the RTT did not change drastically in the last hop. As the IP addresses were
based on a random selection, it was trivial to detect manipulation due to the geographical
haphazardness of the route presented.
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Figure 4.24: Partial traceroute to 38.68.239.50 with random topology enabled.
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The case studies presented us with examples of traceroute manipulation of varying
strengths and weaknesses in their implementation. Those weaknesses included inconsis-
tencies stemming from the incompleteness of the desired deception strategy as well as the
inability to adapt to probes originating from different vantage locations. The strengths
highlighted the means whereby topology deception could be more effective and hinder our
detection progress.
The Pirate Bay example saw an adversary attempting to portray a fake topology and adapt-
ing to flaws in the perceived route by correcting the impossible AS links in the last two
hops with a Chinese IP address in place of the original infeasible Cambodian IP address.
It did not display any obvious IPID and TTL patterns which would have allowed us to au-
tomatically discover it in the IPv4 Routed /24 Topology Dataset using our aforementioned
methodology. Fortunately, a direct traceroute to the last responsive hop enabled us to de-
tect an anomaly in the presented topology. The anomaly was that the presented topology
had a North Korean host in its last responding hop, while the other CAIDA traceroutes to
the said North Korean host yielded a totally different topology as the IP addresses were
different. Likewise, the collection of historic traceroutes originating from multiple geo-
graphically distributed locations aided our analysis by showing that the routing was always
the same regardless of the vantage point. For instance, a prober based in China would
observe a traceroute path with a loop through Europe and North America, before return-
ing to China—a path that is unlikely in normal routing circumstances. We might use this
technique to identify such anomalous traceroutes automatically in future work.
The Star Wars gag using the Cisco VRF setup was presented as IPIDs drawn alternatively
from two monotonic counters, as an artifact of using two physical routers to implement
the deception. Our base filters do not account for this pattern, and it would be useful for a
future filter to do so. While the Star Wars implementation utilized two hardware routers,
an ideal filter should be able to detect any number of devices/hops with a common IPID
counter without any limitation on the number of counters. The duplicate TTL values, the
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long chain of hops in a common subnet, and non-responsive IP addresses used in the reply
hops are potential oddities that raise our interest in inspecting the inferred topology further.
Building on the Star Wars gag’s method of utilizing pre-owned and unused IP addresses, the
Christmas Carol gag did not present obvious signs of manipulation such as increasing IPIDs
and duplicate TTLs. However, it retained the inconsistencies of non-responsive IP ad-
dresses in its common subnet chain and broken AS links before and after that chain of hops.
The non-responsive IP addresses did not respond to ping requests and if there were any
CAIDA traceroutes to those addresses, it did not show a route through the 206.214.251.*
address used in the gag. The broken AS links indicate that the relationship between the
affected AS numbers did not exist in the RIB records we obtained from the Route Views
Archive Project. Compared to the Pirate Bay case, the fact that the deceptive hop chain
occurred solely within the United Kingdom prevented us from leveraging our worldwide
distributed probers and discovering if there were inefficient cross-continental links. If the
machine generating the deceptive hop chain was in the same country as the deception itself,
it would mean that probers based in a foreign country would not have been able to identify
additional continents for the inefficiency check. The gag’s ability to respond equally to
various probe types with the desired topology prevented us from uncovering any discrep-
ancies resulting from an incomplete deception implementation. An incomplete deception
implementation might present a fake topology for a specific traceroute probe type such as
UDP and allow the system default implementation for a regular ICMP traceroute.
The case of the DeTracer identified flaws in implementation of an experimental topol-
ogy deception system such as the duplicate TTLs, identical IPIDs for all traceroutes, and
contrasting differences in the RTT for the last two hops. While the random IP addresses
allowed for deception detection due to the possibility of broken AS links in-between hops,
the experiment showcased the potential of constructing a realistic fake topology similar to
the Pirate Bay’s when probed from a location in Europe. It also showed that adversaries
could craft a route that eliminated inconsistencies in IPIDs, TTLs, AS links, and RTT val-
ues. If the fake topology was deployed as part of an internal network, it would be harder
to unravel deception involved as we would be unable to make use of our multiple vantage
points.






















No No No Yes No Yes
Star Wars Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Christmas
Carol
No No Yes No Yes No
DeTracer Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Table 5.1: Summary of inconsistencies found in case studies.
deception in the case studies.
In our filtered IPv4 Routed /24 Topology Dataset, we had results suggesting anomalies
based on our IPID and TTL filters. There were large numbers of traceroutes with dupli-
cate TTL values as well as long consecutive IPID chains that we termed Akamai, Korean
Telecom and China Telecom patterns. We contacted Akamai Technologies but the enquiry
was inconclusive with regards to the consecutive IPID chains present in numerous varying
traceroutes. There is a possibility that the DNS PTRs were out-of-date and not reflective
of actual Akamai equipment and ownership. Another possibility was the spoofing of IP
addresses by a misconfigured machine which used to own the IP address that was resolved
to an Akamai hostname. If we were to compare the filtered traceroutes in the 2013 dataset
with their counterparts in the 2014 dataset, the consecutive IPID chains of 2013 would
morph into monotonically increasing IPID chains of varying step increments instead, as
evidenced in the 2014 Korean Telecom pattern, or return to seemingly random IPID values
in the newer China Telecom pattern. The earlier case studies showed that not all detection
strategies were successful and more work would be required to programmatically narrow
down the list of potential traceroutes with deceptive inferred topologies.
5.1 Future Work
The first known limitation in the original filter set is that only detecting instances of strictly
continuous consecutive IPID chains is too restrictive. This limitation is evident in the case
studies, such as the Star Wars example, and the matching traceroutes from 2013 in the 2014
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dataset. The identification of IPID chains can be improved by catering for stepped incre-
ments, alternating hop streams, non-responsive hops, and duplicate IPIDs. Constant IPID
chains in a traceroute might indicate the repeated use of a single machine in generating
replies. As the use of constant IPID chains had been found in the DeTracer output, it could
be the case where other deception systems might have this inconsistency. This may work
in conjunction with a filter that detects gaps in the IPID values from one hop to the next by
calculating the rate of change of the IPIDs. An added flexibility to specify a maximum gap
limit will allow us to adapt to long IPID chains with varying gaps of different sizes. Finding
monotonically increasing IPID sequences, and identifying multiple such streams, can give
us an opportunity to automatically discover manipulated traceroutes like the Star Wars gag.
In addition, a duplicate IPID count and its associated IPID value will enable us to detect
traceroutes like the DeTracer’s. By having more metrics to consider, we may then apply a
weighted approach to rank and order potential suspicious traceroutes for further analysis.
The duplicate TTL metric could also be part of this group. A higher weight could be asso-
ciated with duplicate TTLs in a traceroute with interesting IPID chains. This would allow
for another round of validation for traceroutes with duplicate TTLs similar to the DeTracer
and Star Wars case studies. In addition to the duplicate TTLs, future work may include
detection of non-monotonic reply TTLs and TTLs which merely follow a sequence but are
not consecutive. The identification of these metrics would aid in customizing subsequent
rounds of filtering for further analysis.
As discussed in Section 4.1.2, there were significant numbers of traceroutes containing
continuous consecutive IPID chains of six hops and below. The filtering process could
be extended to include these smaller chains together with the more comprehensive IPID
filters. Furthermore, the matching of filtered traceroutes found in the 2013 dataset could be
applied to both the 2014 and 2015 datasets for a three-year continuity check.
An area which may be improved is geolocation of the individual IP addresses for each
hop of the traceroutes. For instance, a lookup table containing approximate RTTs between
source and destination countries involved will aid in determining whether a hop’s RTT
is realistic or feasible. Suppose a traceroute hop has an IP address residing in the same
country as the prober and its RTT is 100 ms, and there is another hop in the same traceroute
containing an IP address belonging to a country across the globe with a similar 100 ms RTT,
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suspicions will be raised as the reported location is inconsistent with the recorded timing.
The RTTs similarities would mean that the data traveled faster than light to achieve the
lower-than-expected latency. This is highly infeasible to go faster than the speed of light.
The Pirate Bay’s choice of having IP addresses in two continents (i.e., North America and
Asia) exposes a susceptibility where a lookup table may identify a continental hop cycle
if the prober is based in Asia, especially if the prober and the destination are in the same
country.
Filtering the IPv4 Routed /24 Topology Dataset is a time-intensive process due to the sheer
number of traceroutes collected every cycle. For example, if it took approximately 25
seconds to parse and filter a warts file with 792 traceroutes and there were 5,313,384,228
traceroutes in the 2013 dataset, the operation would take 5.3 years to complete. In response
to the duration required, we ran the file processing operations in parallel under a simple
script. While we used Python to process the compressed warts files, a non-interpreted
language like C could shorten the processing duration. A distributed compute cluster such
as an Apache Hadoop-based system would also provide scalability and reduced processing
times [51]. An alternative approach could be to identify the IP addresses hosting web
services and collect historic and real-time traceroutes instead. The focus is to prioritize IP
addresses with known web services in the hope that a deception similar to The Pirate Bay
case may be uncovered earlier. This approach takes advantage of the ability to time the TCP
connections and compare the reported traceroute RTT and the resultant direct TCP RTT. It
will also provide tracking of changes to a website’s topology by following the IP addresses
from resolved DNS names. Subsequently, the IPID and duplicate TTL pattern tests may be
applied to narrow down the number of potential cases containing inconsistencies for further
analysis.
The matching process of identifying traceroutes in the 2013 dataset against their equivalents
in the 2014 dataset involved using the destination IP addresses as the key criteria. As a
result, we also obtained traceroutes with source IP addresses different from the original
traceroute in the 2013 dataset. A different approach could be to use the same vantage point
and obtain traceroutes to IP addresses in the same /24 subnet, as the desired destination IP
address. This would enable discovery of patterns within the same /24 subnet as evidenced
in The Pirate Bay case.
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The Pirate Bay and DeTracer case studies were able to generate the desired deceptive
topologies based on spoofing IP addresses on fabricated hops. This implies a dependency
on the hosting network to allow source IP address spoofing. Networks banning such be-
havior will be only be able to generate topologies using IP addresses they own. This limits
traceroute deception to internal network addresses. If there was an efficient method to
determine whether a particular network allowed source IP spoofing, we could then flag
the network as a plausible target with an inherent ability to portray fake topologies with
non-owned addresses. Organizations with large networks such as ISPs may contain transit
points due to peering agreements. These agreements may complicate matters by allowing
IP addresses outside of an ISP’s original network.
In addition to reply and probe TTLs, the quoted TTLs may provide clues as to whether hops
in a traceroute may be hidden when there are hops with quoted TTL values of zero. The
zero-TTL forwarding anomaly explained by Augustin et al. highlighted the possibility of
duplicate IP addresses with consecutive IPID values as a result of a router misconfiguration.
It may improve on our understanding during the traceroute analysis.
Lastly, the steady growth of Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) addresses, given the satu-
ration of the IPv4 space, will eventually require extra effort to analyze these IPv6 trace-
routes [52]. The similarity between the two IP versions is the common underlying tech-
nique of utilizing the ICMP Time Exceeded and Destination Unreachable messages for
traceroutes to work. The major difference is the issue of the searchable address space.
The IPv4 address space is 232 while the IPv6 address space is 2128. It will be more diffi-
cult and time consuming to filter through the entire IPv6 dataset. Hence, we will need a
prioritization list and faster filter implementations for such future work.
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APPENDIX:
A.1 Raw Summary of the 2013 Filtered Dataset
hops lconsec ldconsec adconsec aconsec httl
1 64508982 38896366 41914644 68994014 47666721
2 4423018 301696 613279 4441020 13733703
3 759464 123055 130679 764845 4895758
4 73711 10244 11130 75132 2236425
5 44026 3911 4007 44791 1409844
6 26834 1057 1091 27386 1464274
7 30601 131 140 33096 792606
8 18152 3 4 18760 502030
9 38200 2 2 38565 267701
10 16286 1 3 16848 109876
11 14480 1 2 14755 45949
12 10838 0 0 11022 22807
13 6274 0 0 6396 8989
14 5699 0 0 5743 6713
15 10320 0 0 10422 11530
16 31413 0 0 31690 30818
17 5604 0 0 5665 8764
18 609 0 0 620 1723
19 223 0 0 229 629
20 1613 0 0 1619 1778
21 3 0 0 6 108
22 4 0 0 4 59
23 2 0 0 6 54
24 3 0 0 6 43
25 2 0 0 5 28
26 2 0 0 1 8
27 2 0 0 5 11
28 2 0 0 4 19
29 3 0 0 5 14
30 2 0 0 6 11
31 5 0 0 8 23
32 1 0 0 4 10
33 3 0 0 4 19
34 1 0 0 1 15
35 3 0 0 4 19
36 3 0 0 4 5
37 1 0 0 1 4
38 2 0 0 2 5
39 1 0 0 1 3
40 1 0 0 0 2
41 0 0 0 1 1
42 0 0 0 0 5
43 1 0 0 1 0
44 0 0 0 0 1
45 0 0 0 0 3
47 1 0 0 1 1
49 1 0 0 1 3
51 0 0 0 0 2
52 1 0 0 1 1
53 0 0 0 0 2
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54 1 0 0 1 1
55 1 0 0 1 1
56 1 0 0 2 4
57 1 0 0 1 1
58 0 0 0 0 2
59 1 0 0 2 2
60 0 0 0 1 0
61 1 0 0 1 1
62 0 0 0 0 1
65 2 0 0 2 3
68 1 0 0 1 2
70 1 0 0 1 1
72 0 0 0 0 2
73 1 0 0 1 1
75 1 0 0 1 1
77 0 0 0 0 1
78 1 0 0 1 0
79 0 0 0 0 1
82 2 0 0 2 2
84 0 0 0 0 1
85 0 0 0 0 1
86 0 0 0 0 2
87 0 0 0 0 1
88 0 0 0 0 2
89 0 0 0 1 0
90 0 0 0 0 3
91 0 0 0 0 1
93 0 0 0 0 1
94 0 0 0 0 3
97 0 0 0 0 1
98 0 0 0 0 1
101 0 0 0 0 1
105 0 0 0 0 1
106 0 0 0 0 1
111 1 0 0 1 2
115 0 0 0 0 1
118 1 0 0 1 0
119 0 0 0 1 1
120 0 0 0 0 1
121 0 0 0 0 1
128 0 0 0 0 1
131 1 0 0 0 2
133 0 0 0 0 1
135 0 0 0 0 1
136 0 0 0 0 1
137 1 0 0 1 2
138 0 0 0 0 1
139 0 0 0 0 2
140 0 0 0 0 1
142 0 0 0 0 2
143 0 0 0 0 1
145 1 0 0 1 1
146 0 0 0 0 1
149 0 0 0 0 1
159 0 0 0 0 1
160 0 0 0 0 1
178 0 0 0 1 1
180 0 0 0 0 1
187 0 0 0 0 1
192 0 0 0 0 1
193 0 0 0 0 1
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196 0 0 0 0 2
198 0 0 0 0 1
210 0 0 0 0 1
213 0 0 0 0 1
233 0 0 0 1 0
240 0 0 0 0 1
243 0 0 0 0 1
252 0 0 0 0 1
254 0 0 0 0 1
291 0 0 0 0 1
300 0 0 0 0 1
301 0 0 0 1 0
311 0 0 0 0 1
328 0 0 0 0 1
369 0 0 0 0 1
415 1 0 0 1 0
449 0 0 0 0 1
459 1 0 0 0 0
466 0 0 0 0 1
565 0 0 0 0 1
699 1 0 0 1 0
1155 0 0 0 0 1
2363 0 0 0 1 0
4067 0 0 0 0 1
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